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Charter schools have become an important aspect of Utah’s unique K-12 
education system as they have increased in both popularity and number in recent 
years.  The increase of charter schools has allowed for a higher degree of 
parental choice regarding their children’s education as well as various effects on 
the traditional public schools.  Economic theory suggests that increased 
competition may influence firms to increase quality and/or decrease price.  The 
question remains if the same holds for the education market in Utah.  Nationwide 
existing evidence in the literature is mixed, where many studies have shown 
positive competitive effects of charters on public schools while a few others have 
shown negative or negligible competitive effects.  Further analysis for the Utah 
education market is therefore warranted.  This research identifies and analyzes 
the competitive effects of charter schools on the academic achievement of 
students in traditional public schools (K-6) in Utah.  School-level criterion-
referenced test (CRT) scores serve as a measure of academic achievement for 
the years 2005 through 2010.  For completeness, two broadly-accepted 
measures of competition are utilized.  Results suggest positive and significant 
competitive effects on traditional public school achievement in the subjects of 

































































“[W]e allow the market, consumer choice and competition to work in nearly every 
industry except for the one that may matter most: education.” 
- Milton Friedman,  
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From a school productivity viewpoint, that is academic achievement per 
dollar spent, the United States has shown dramatic declines during the past 40 
years (Hoxby 2003).  The overall productivity decline is not the only issue at 
hand; academic achievement varies greatly across demographic areas where the 
quality of schooling is high in wealthy suburbs, reasonable in small towns, and 
substantially worse in the inner cities.  Achievement gaps between high and low 
income levels also continue to rise.   
These harsh realities have prompted many policy leaders, teachers, and 
parents to explore different education solutions aimed at helping children 
succeed in school.  Charter schools have emerged as an attractive alternative to 
traditional public schools.  They remain publicly funded, albeit normally at a lower 
rate than traditional public schools, but generally have greater freedom in 
decisions of personnel, administration style, and curriculum.  Over the last 20 
years their role has become more and more prominent in offering educational 
alternatives for parents and students, especially so in Utah. 
Similar to other areas, the discipline of economics can lend general 
theories that prove helpful in studying the impact of these education dynamics.  
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Specifically, theories of competition, public expenditures, and industrial 
organization will directly apply to the many questions surrounding the emergence 
of charter schools.  In his seminal theory of local expenditures, Tiebout (1956) 
argues that local demand for public goods and services represents the true 
preferences of the consumer-voters, and therefore the revenue-expenditure 
patterns of the localities are given “approval” by the consumer-voters who 
choose to live there.  If this were not the case, consumer-voters would choose to 
leave for a better option (following Tiebout’s infamous “vote with their feet” 
mechanism).  This theory is directly relevant not only to state education funding 
but also to consumer-voter preferences of local K-12 education composition.  By 
increasing the market share held by charter schools, parents (consumer-voters) 
are given a larger set of education options and are therefore more likely to find 
their preferred preference pattern.  As Holmes, DeSimone, and Rupp (2003) 
point out, this also gives parents a “credible threat” against traditional public 
schools who continually fail to make improvements.   
 Paramount to this research is the impact that charter schools have on the 
existing traditional public schools.  Comparative analysis of achievement levels 
between the traditional public schools and the newly emerging charter schools is 
outside the scope of this research.  Rather, I seek to identify any competitive 
effects of charter schools on the academic achievement of students in the 
existing traditional public schools.  If Tiebout’s theory holds with respect to 
education, then we would expect there to be gains in achievement of traditional 
public schools by the mere existence of competing charter schools, ceteris 
paribus.   
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 This research will not only be of interest to education and public policy, but 
will also have potential impact on the state and nationwide economies.  Within 
the recent decade, Utah has benefitted from a higher educated work force as 
numerous firms have expanded facilities and production here locally.  In order to 
encourage continual job growth, the local education system must remain 
productive.  Both state and nationwide, educated labor will continue to be a vital 
component of economic production.  A growing and dynamic economy will 
demand an educated workforce, one that delivers the tools and skills necessary 
for participation in the global markets.  As suggested by Lenontif (1956), the 
sources of American economic growth have historically been intensive in human 
capital, a notion that is even more persuasive today.  It is clear that the United 
States will consequently benefit immensely from a more productive and dynamic 
education system as we produce more human capital-intensive goods.  This 
research, therefore, is not only interesting to education and public policy, but has 
potential impacts on the health and competitiveness of the overall 
macroeconomy.   
 My research begins by providing a comprehensive review of the existing 
literature on education markets and competition in Chapter 2, gives a 
background of charter schools, with special emphasis on Utah’s details, and 
examines education through the lens of an economic market in Chapter 3.  I then 
describe the potential behavioral incentives created by competition and provide a 
general conceptual model in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 outlines the data sources, 
individual variable definitions, and presents the economic models through which 
statistical estimation will be approached.  Lastly, the results are presented in 
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chapter 6, followed by a conclusion in Chapter 7.  Ultimately, this research 
empirically tests many economic theories relating to competition.  As charter 
schools have emerged in Utah, their full impacts on the overall education 
















 It’s a well-accepted notion that education continues to be an important 
aspect of policy nationwide, a point historically true since our nation’s founding.  
Moreover, an increasing number of policies are aimed at increasing educational 
outcomes in order to boost economic competitiveness and growth.  Given these 
realities, and also seeing the dramatic declines in academic achievement per 
dollar spent over the past 40 years, it is to little wonder why the study of 
education has seen increased attention in the existing literature, especially so in 
conjunction with the field of Economics. 
Charter school policies and laws, specific by state, all remain relatively 
young nationwide.  Clearly, it certainly follows that the study of competition from 
newly-emerged charter schools is therefore also relatively new in the field of 
education economics.  In spite of its recent nature, much empirical work has 
been done in limited areas.  Much of this work focuses on states that have 
enacted education policies allowing for the development and growth of charter 
schools, and/or the expansion of various school choice policies.  These states 
include (but are not limited to) California, Michigan, Minnesota, Arizona, Florida, 
Ohio, and North Carolina.  Existing literature employs a wide variety of 
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methodological approaches that produce an equally wide variety of outcomes.  
Of particular interest to my research is reviewing different methodological 
approaches of quantifying school competition, specifically those of measuring 
charter school competition, and using it in the achievement models.  A common 
component found in nearly all of the reviewed articles is utilizing distance as a 
price of attending competing charter schools, which subsequently serves as a 
measure of competition.  This aspect will certainly be critical to any study on 
school choice, and is a central element in my own research.  Another 
component, although less common in the literature, is the use of enrollment 
share to identify competing schools’ market share in education.  This approach 
borrows some of the same theoretical foundations found in industrial organization 
economics and is indeed useful in its application to education markets. 
Another important aspect to any empirical work is to review the various 
statistical approaches taken in the existing literature.  As expected, there exist a 
variety of statistical models utilized in the reviewed literature, but I pay special 
attention to research done on longitudinal data (also known as panel data) in 
relation to education markets.  Many commonalities can be found between past 
research and my own models, which ultimately add strength and persuasiveness 
to my results.  
In this chapter, I review the various methodological approaches that 
address both the measurement of competition as well as the measurement of 
academic achievement.  Also, I address and review the statistical approaches 
used in analyzing the various empirical data.  In doing so, I have separated out 
the articles that have found positive competitive effects from the articles that 
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have found negative and/or negligible competitive effects. 
 
 
Evidence of Positive Competitive Effects 
 
 I first begin by reviewing an article by a particularly well-known economist, 
Caroline Hoxby, who has written extensively on the subject of school choice and 
whose work is commonly cited in the existing literature.  In her article, “School 
Choice and School Productivity – Could School Choice Be a Tide that Lifts All 
Boats?” (Hoxby 2003), she views academic achievement in a unique framework.  
Rather than strictly defining academic achievement as the bare nominal value, 
Hoxby’s work is centered on the idea of school productivity – that is achievement 
per dollar spent.  Utilizing school-level data from Arizona and Michigan, she 
compares the performance of traditional public schools before and after the 
introduction of charter competition by employing a difference-in-difference 
strategy.  An important aspect of Hoxby’s model is that she addresses an often-
overlooked dynamic of historical achievement trends.  Considering the reality that 
charter schools likely emerged as a response to local circumstances, preexisting 
productivity trends were taken into account in the model by incorporating a de-
trended differences-in-differences strategy.  This more sophisticated strategy 
controls for each school’s initial conditions.  Moreover, in addition to examining 
the nominal effects of competition, estimates are presented on how schools’ 
productivity trends changes after facing competition.  Hoxby defines charter 
competition as a nonlinear function, that is, a competitive threshold, which is met 
after 6% of a district’s enrollment belongs to charter schools.  She finds that 
charter competition in Arizona and Michigan increases traditional public school 
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achievement scores in both math and reading.  In order to study the impact of 
competition derived from charter school existence, Hoxby argues that the 
following requirements must be met: (a) There is a realistic possibility that at 
least 5% of students enrolled in traditional public schools could go to charter 
schools; (b) the traditional public schools lose at least some of their funding when 
a student leaves for a charter, and (c) the policy has been in place for a few 
years.  All three of those conditions are met for Hoxby’s research, and certainly 
are met in the case of Utah’s education system.  For example, by 1999, 
approximately 3.5% of all nonprivate elementary students in Michigan were 
enrolled in charter schools.  For Utah, as of 2009, a full 4.0% of all nonprivate 
elementary students were enrolled in charter schools.  This particular article is 
one of many that Hoxby has written on the subject of school competition, and 
remains an important comparative piece to my own research.   
 Another commonly-cited piece in the school choice literature is done by 
Holmes, DeSimone, and Rupp (2003), where they study the impact of charter 
school competition in North Carolina.  Of the surveyed states that were early 
adopters of charter school laws, North Carolina has seen some of the greatest 
growth in charter school use.  By starting from a conceptual framework of a 
school agent’s utility (ostensibly a school principal), they explore the effects of 
competition with a greater foundation of economic underpinnings.  As the 
measure of competition, they utilize five indicator variables that signal if the 
traditional school is within 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 kilometers of the nearest charter 
school.  It becomes increasingly important to note that charter school placement 
may be an endogenous factor, responding to either high achievement level areas 
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(in order to “skim” the high-performing students) or responding to low 
achievement level areas (and subsequent dissatisfied parents).  Holmes, et al. 
acknowledge these possibilities and examine the North Carolina county-level 
factors that may influence the location of charter school placement.  They report 
that Hausman tests of exogeneity are insignificant and therefore imply that these 
location measures can be treated as exogenous.  In addition to traditional cross-
section regression models, they utilize both an instrumental variable panel model 
(borrowing the Arellano-Bond procedure for dynamic panel models), as well as a 
maximum likelihood model that accounts for initial conditions.  All of the models 
produce evidence of overall gains from charter school competition.  The gains 
approximately equate to a one percent increase in achievement when a 
traditional public school is faced with competition from a nearby charter school.     
 Important to any empirical work studying educational outcomes is the 
inclusion of control variables that aid in isolating a particular effect of interest.  In 
an article examining outcome in Florida, Sass (2006) argues that much of the 
existing research regarding charter competition lacks “sufficient controls for 
student characteristics” which opens up the possibility of numerous selection-
bias problems.  He proposes a value-added specified model that holds school 
achievement as a function of school inputs, lagged achievement, and a fixed 
effect on an individual level.  Like Holmes, et al. (2003), Sass utilizes the 
Arellano-Bond procedure for dynamic panel data, which is essentially an 
instrumental variable approach, in addition to his restricted value-added model.  
To control for the location endogeneity possibility, a school fixed effect is added 
to his achievement model, which is very close to the particular approach I use in 
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estimating the competitive effect of charter schools.  As a measure of 
competition, he first identifies charter, private, and other traditional public schools 
within 2.5, 5, and 10 miles of each examined traditional public school.  As a 
supplemental measure of competition, he also includes a measure of market 
share of charter, private and other traditional public schools.  His results find that 
the presence of one or more charter schools within 2.5 miles of a traditional 
public school is associated with a 3% increase in the average annual math score 
gain of traditional public schools.  As expected, these increases diminish as the 
distance to the nearest charter school increases, consistent with the economic 
theories of competition.  Using the measure of market share also produces 
similar results; charter school market share is positively correlated with math 
scores in traditional public schools.  Similar measures of competition are included 
in my own models.   
 Due to its extensive geographic size and large levels of population, Texas 
remains one of the most important states in leading and determining K-12 school 
policy.  Charter school legislation originally passed in Texas in 1995, after which 
17 new charter schools opened up.  These particular state characteristics make 
Texas a prime case for further investigation of competitive effects following 
charter school emergence.  The work of Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen 
(2008) examines student achievement in the traditional public schools after 
charter schools have penetrated the education market.  By using a panel of test 
scores that span across 8 years (which is similar to my own, although contains 2 
more years), they examine how charter competition has affected the students 
who have remained in the traditional public schools.  Similar to Hoxby (2003) and 
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others, their method of measuring competition essentially involves measuring the 
portion of public school students who are enrolled in a charter school, measured 
at the district level.  As a supplement, they also include the number of charter 
schools within 5 miles and within 6-10 miles of the traditional public school.  
Using a value-added approach prevalent in the literature, a fixed effect model is 
employed that includes a fixed effect specific to the individual school, as well as a 
vector of school inputs.  A main benefit of using a fixed effect model is the way it 
controls for preexisting student ability and other family/parental characteristics 
that influence achievement in the surrounding population.  Moreover, a fixed 
effect approach properly addresses the potential for endogeneity bias of charter 
school location, a point of special emphasis in my own research.  Ultimately, their 
results suggest positive effects of charter competition on the academic 
achievement of students remaining in traditional public schools.  The reported 
gains in achievement are consistent for both math and reading test scores, and 
consistent across their various measures of competition. 
 
 
Evidence of Negative Competitive Effects 
 
 Of the reviewed literature studying the competitive effects of charter 
schools, a notable work is effectively presented by Ni (2009).  Michigan is 
another state that has historically influenced K-12 education nationwide, and is 
also an early adopter of charter school legislation, making it a worthy candidate 
for further empirical investigation.  Ni focuses on the competitive effect of charter 
schools on the efficiency of the surrounding traditional public schools in 
Michigan.  A school-level longitudinal data set covering the years 1994 to 2004 is 
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utilized.  The initial charter school legislation was passed in 1993, allowing for the 
emergence of various charters over the years.  Ten years after the law passed, 
Michigan had 226 charter schools enrolling 92,000 students, which accounts for 
5% of the state’s public school population.  Ni also points out the importance of 
Michigan’s school finance system, which attaches charter funding to each 
student enrolled, thus creating an ideal competitive environment for such a study.  
A stated objective of Ni’s work is to address a substantial limitation of previous 
research by distinguishing any competitive effects in the short-run from those in 
the long-run.  The measurement of competition comes through both the 
magnitude and the duration of competition, thus allowing for distinction of time 
length.  Differing from some of the other research, Ni’s analysis is done on the 
district level rather than the individual school level, as data permitted.  The 
measure of charter competition magnitude is similar to Hoxby’s (2003), where 
competition faced by a district is the percentage of students who transferred out 
of a traditional public school into a charter school.  The magnitude of competition, 
as we’ve seen, can either be measured as a continuous or dummy variable.  Ni 
follows Hoxby (2003) and Bettinger (2005) by using a dummy variable that takes 
on the value of 1 if the percentage of charter enrollment reaches 6%, and 0 
otherwise.  To capture the duration of charter competition, Ni included three other 
dummy variables that indicate whether the competition was in the short, medium, 
and long run if the competition lasted less than 3 years, 4 to 5 years, and longer 
than 5 years, respectively.  With these measures of competition, Ni uses a 
variety of estimation techniques to identify any competitive effects from charter 
schools.  By employing a pooled OLS approach that aggregates the observed 
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years, there emerges a negative association between charter competition and 
student achievement, although it is much smaller once a set of control variables 
are included.  A more complete fixed effect approach is ultimately utilized which 
produces more persuadable results.  This approach takes into account the 
longitudinal nature of the data which is argued to be more accurate while 
providing a better fit.  Overall, this methodology produces evidence of a negative 
but insignificant competitive effect on student achievement.  This effect becomes 
larger in the medium-run and significant only in the long-run.  These negative 
effects of charter competition are consistent for both math and reading tests in 4th 
and 7th grades.  Ni’s work is an important piece in the education literature for two 
reasons.  First, it uniquely distinguishes the duration of charter competition faced 
by the traditional public schools.  Second, and more important, the fixed effect 
approach used allows for charter school endogeneity and operates under very 
plausible assumptions.  That being said, my own empirical approach includes 
many of the same characteristics.  Ni’s work is also distinguished from much of 
the other literature in that it finds evidence of negative effects of charter school 
competition on the achievement of students in the traditional public schools.   
 
 
Evidence of Negligible Competitive Effects 
 
 The economic theory that underlies much of the empirical studies 
examining charter competition can plausibly allow for positive evidence, negative 
evidence, and even little to no evidence of any competitive effects.  Not unlike 
other areas of empirical investigation, some studies have found little to no effect 
of charter school competition on traditional public schools.  Among them is an 
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important piece done by Buddin and Zimmer (2005) looking into the effects of 
increased charter use in California’s school system.  A unique aspect included in 
their work is a survey administered to various charter school and similar 
traditional public school principals.  This survey provides deep insight into 
whether or not principals themselves have made meaningful changes in 
response to increased charter competition, and fills a void left in the existing 
literature of supplementing empirical data with qualitative findings.  They find, 
among other things, that 25% of principals in matched traditional public schools 
have changed instructional practices in response to charter competition.  In other 
areas, such as financial aspects, the majority of principals find little to no effect of 
charter schools.  These survey results pair nicely with an accompanying 
empirical analysis done of student reading and math scores over a four year time 
period.  The measure of competition comes in numerous forms that include the 
distance to the nearest charter, the number of charters within 2.5 miles, and the 
share of public students enrolled in a charter school.  Together with various 
demographic controls, the measures of competition are put into a fixed effect 
model that is consistent with the literature.  Overall, their results show little 
evidence of charter schools affecting traditional public school achievement in 
California.  Ultimately, they are unable to find consistency with the previous 
literature’s evidence of positive or negative competitive effects from charter 









 After reviewing the existing literature on the subject of charter school 
competition, it is clear that there is not necessarily a clear and consistent 
consensus of evidence.  That being said, there indeed is a strong majority of 
research that finds positive effects from charter competition.  In spite of a 
consistent picture of evidence, quantitative methodology, however, is fairly 
consistent across the research.  In particular, the measurement of competition in 
all of the reviewed articles involves using either distance to the charter schools, 
enrollment share of charter schools, or both.  My research will include various 
measures of charter competition that include both of these concepts.  In addition 
to the competitive metrics, the statistical approaches are surprisingly related from 
piece to piece.  The use of a fixed effect model for longitudinal education data is 
prevalent throughout the literature, and is ultimately adopted in my work.   
 The importance of studying various charter school policies is evidenced by 
the large amount of empirical research that has gone into calculating its effects.  
Seeing that the overall existing evidence is mixed, the topic is well suitable for 















 This research seeks to examine the competitive effects of charter schools 
in Utah.  By doing so, it is necessary to establish the general framework under 
which public schools operate, both charter and traditional public.  In this chapter, 
I give an introduction and background of charter schools generally, and the 
specific characteristics of charter schools in Utah, with special emphasis on the 
latter.  I then discuss the structure of education in terms of a market, where 
buyers and sellers meet.  In doing this, I address the similarities and differences 
between traditional public schools and charter schools.  Finally, I discuss the 






In order to understand the nuances of the education market, a note on the 
structure of charter schools is necessary.  Charter school characteristics and 
basic structure, although are quite similar nationwide, still vary from state to 
state.  For my research, I will stay focused on the characteristics and legal 
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structure unique to Utah’s public education system.  First, a brief introduction and 
background of school choice in Utah is worth mentioning.   
School choice has become especially important and contentious in the 
state of Utah over the past decade.  In early 2007, the Utah legislature passed 
the “Parent Choice in Education” Act (H.B. 148), which was essentially a voucher 
law for education.  The law was somewhat contentious, which lead to its 
placement on the ballot that November and was eventually repealed by popular 
vote.  The law was initially designed to offer scholarships to families who choose 
to send their children to private schools.  The scholarship amounts ranged from 
$500 to $3,000, depending on the individual family’s income level.  Since the 
dollar amount of the individual scholarships remained well below the per-pupil 
funding in Utah, the voucher program indeed had the potential to save Utah 
taxpayers a significant and increasing amount of money over the tenure of the 
program. Moreover, in addition to fiscal savings, the voucher program also was 
likely to decrease the average class size in the traditional public schools by 
acting as a relief valve for ever-growing enrollments.  
This noteworthy instance of passage and then repeal of an impactful 
education law portrays the overall desire and contentiousness for educational 
choice in Utah.  In light of these facts, it is to little wonder why Utah has seen so 
much growth in charter schools over the past decade.  Utah first passed its 
charter school law allowing for the emergence of charter schools in 1998.  Since 
then, their popularity and use has increased tremendously.  By 2010, over 40 K-6 
nonalternative charter schools emerged in Utah (which is the defined criteria that 
I use in my analysis), most of which ended up along the so-called “Wasatch 
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Front,” comprising of Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah counties.  It is worth mentioning 
that many charter schools that have emerged are alternative in nature and 
specialize in unique areas such as Autism and English as a Second Language 
(ESL).  Charter school growth and popularity in Utah remain strong today as 
more and more parents seek public education options.   
It is necessary first to establish the general public structure of charter 
schools.  To begin, charter schools are 100% public schools that are 
independently operated.  Charter schools generally have an increased level of 
accountability, but enjoy more flexibility in terms of curriculum style.  As outlined 
in Utah Code 53A, charter schools are “considered to be public schools within 
the state’s public education system” and “governed by independent boards and 
held accountable to a legally binding written contractual agreement.”  Moreover 
(and interestingly), a charter school “may be established by creating a new 
school or converting an existing public school to charter status”.  The specific 
requirements for charter schools in Utah (also listed in Utah Code 53A) include 
10 important mandates.  Among the most important requirements for charter 
schools are that they be “nonsectarian in its programs”, may not “charge tuition 
or fees, except those fees normally charged by other public schools”, and that 
they must submit “the same annual reports required of other public schools under 
this title.”  
 In terms of governing bodies and operations, charter schools also differ.  
Traditional public schools operate under the supervision and direction of local 
school districts, where the majority of education decisions and policies are made.  
This is in contrast to the structure of charter schools, where they operate under 
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the supervision and direction of the State Charter School Board, where each 
individual charter school essentially exists as its own district.  Under Utah Code 
53A, the State Charter School Board authorizes “the establishment of charter 
schools,” annually reviews and evaluates “the performance of charter schools,” 
and monitors the charter schools.  
Like their traditional public school counterparts, charter schools are held to 
strict state requirements of student and annual progress reports.  There are no 
differences in reporting requirements for charter schools compared to those 
required of traditional public schools.  Moreover, as is the case with traditional 
public schools, charter schools are required to employ academically accredited 
teachers certified by the state of Utah.  These requirement measures seek to 
provide, to the taxpayers as well as the parents of school-going children, 
assurance of rigor and quality of the public education system in Utah.   
As seen, many similarities exist between traditional public schools and 
charter schools, where both entities share numerous characteristics and 
mechanisms.  There are, however, a few notable differences that contrast the 
two, among them are curriculum and administrative flexibility.  While charter 
schools are held to the same reporting regulations and guidelines as traditional 
public schools, they do have some additional flexibility regarding curriculum.  
Much of the curriculum decisions can be made at a school level, with heavy 
involvement and input directly from parents.  Although outside the scope of my 
research (and excluded in my dataset), many charter schools are specifically 
founded to specialize in alternative schooling, such as autism, English as a 
Second Language, etc.  As for the “regular” charter schools, parents enjoy 
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greater opportunities to provide input to the curriculum approaches.  One other 
notable difference comes in the form of staffing and administrative structures.  In 
Utah, charter schools are exempt from any existing negotiated contracts related 
to the hiring and dismissal of teachers.  In other words, charter schools are not 
legally required to hire unionized teachers, although they retain the option to do 
so.  Charter schools are, however, in all cases required to hire teachers who are 
certified by the State of Utah.  Together, these notable differences generally 
allow for greater flexibility for charter schools.  In their relatively short history in 
Utah, they have provided public school options to parent who are seeking them 
for their children.   
 As a greater number of charter schools emerge, their popularity and use 
have risen.  Given the increasing popularity in Utah, charter school enrollment 
capacity remains somewhat limited.  Increases in enrollment capacity must first 
be requested by the individual school, and then approved by the State Board of 
Education.  Funding must be then be finalized and appropriated by the state 
Legislature for charter school enrollment growth.     
 Charter schools have emerged as a viable option for parents who, for one 
reason or another, are in need of education alternatives outside of the traditional 
public schools.  Although the similarities between charter schools and traditional 
public schools are numerous, the few differences among them effectively 







The Market Structure of K-12 Education 
 
 When analyzing different aspects of K-12 education, it is helpful to view 
the system as a market, where the buyers of education (students and parents) 
meet the sellers of education (schools).   From this viewpoint, where education is 
the good exchanged, both agents (buyers and sellers) will operate under 
particular constraints inherent in any market.   
 On the demand side, students face particular mobility constraints when 
participating in the education market.  These constraints arise due to the rigid 
structure of the public K-12 system.  America’s K-12 education system is 
comprised of numerous regulations addressing assignment of schools, which are 
almost entirely a function of the locale in which students live.  Utah is no different, 
where parents are given virtually no choice in public school enrollment.  Under 
Utah Code (Code 53A, Chapter 2, Section 207), schools may open up their 
particular enrollment for students who do not reside in their district, provided that 
their current enrollment level is “at or below the open enrollment threshold”.  
(Other exceptions can be made at the discretion of the local school board.  
Seeing that these cases, however, are indeed rare and cumbersome, it is 
therefore a reasonable assumption in my framework to assume extremely limited 
public school choice in these instances).  These enrollment constraints quickly 
become binding year after year due to the fact that individual schools only 
operate below the open enrollment threshold on very rare cases.  This is partly a 
function of Utah’s large family size, as well as limited public funding, especially in 
relation to neighboring states.  These constraints are important to this study 
specifically because of the various affects they have on student behavior.  As we 
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further understand the relationship between the market structure under which 
students operate and how that relates to student and parent behavior, we gain 
critical insights into how the various educational policies affect outcomes.  This 
latter point is specifically of interest to charter school policies in Utah, as they 
provide general market mechanisms of competition. 
 The supply side also faces particular constraints when providing students 
with education.  For decades now, everything from academic curriculum 
programs to time schedules has been regulated and directed from a central 
authority – a school district, the state office of education, or the federal 
department of education.  This structure places numerous constraints on the part 
of the teachers and schools and leaves them with limited flexibility.   
 
 
K-12 Education Policies in Utah 
 
 As I will show, Utah’s public education framework has many unique 
aspects that differentiate it from other states.  This is, in part, due to differences 
in demographic and cultural aspects unique to Utah’s population.  Certainly, 
demographic differences are notable and important to education policy, 
especially so in Utah.  The differences described herein provide particular 
challenges and constraints as well as unique opportunities for overall education 
policy in Utah.  
 First, it is important to provide context to the demographic differences of 
Utah compared against characteristics of the nationwide population.  For 
instance, a notable difference of Utah’s population occurs in its age distribution.  
These differences are highlighted in Figure 3.1, where we see a large number 
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portion of Utah’s population gathered near the young end of the scale, which is 
disproportionately large when compared to the nationwide population.  Clearly, 
public education is responsible for precisely this portion of Utah’s population.  In 
light of these age distinctions, it is even more evident that Utah faces particularly 
important education constraints. 
 Another difference worth noting is the very large size of Utah’s school 
districts in relation to other states.  Empirically, this characteristic is dealt with by 
using school-level data, which contrasts some of the literature that uses district-
level data for its unit of analysis, though many articles use school-level data as 
well.  To start, Utah’s counties are disproportionately large in relation to other 
states, partly due to the high concentration of population along much of the 
“Wasatch Front” area, comprising of Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah counties.  School 
enrollments, subsequently, are also highly concentrated in these large counties 
and districts.  In fact, as of 2010, more than two thirds (68%) of Utah’s entire K–6 
(predefined in my data) enrollment was in only three counties – Davis county, 
Salt Lake county, and Utah county.  These large counties generally translate into 
large school districts for Utah, where the top five districts contain 59% of all 
enrolled K-12 students (predefined in my data, including charter school 
enrollment within the districts’ geographical boundaries).  
 These details are important to note because of the analysis on behavior of 
the individual agents.  When studying the impacts of education policies, they 
ultimately have their affect when they cause a change in behavior.  This may 
take the form of behavior changes by students, by parents, or by school 
administrators.  Ultimately, the main focus of my research involves studying the 
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impacts caused by the behavior of the school administrators in response to 
overall student behavior, after facing competition.  In Utah’s case, competitive 
pressures are likely to be felt by individual schools, but it is certainly plausible to 
assume that district administrators will already be made aware of any future 
competition.  In all, these facts will help build a general framework of behavior 
and economic theory that will support further empirical evidence.  As outlined, the 




Education Financing Mechanisms 
 
 The process by which schools are financed, and the mechanisms behind 
those dynamics, are important to include in any study on education.  This is 
especially true when discussing their effects on the behavior of the school 
officials, given the incentives created by the financing structure.  Although not 
entirely comprehensive in nature, the following will provide meaningful context 
that proves necessary for the theoretical principles underlying competitive 
effects.   
In general, public schools are financed through a combination of local 
property taxes, state income tax, and federal tax dollars.  In Utah, education 
funding comes from federal, state, and local sources.  Although it varies by 
school district, overall statewide education funding is broken down as such: 
Federal funds account for about 7% of school district’s revenue, state funds 
account for about 71%, and local funding accounts for about 22% (Utah State 
Office of Education).  Similar to many other states, Utah’s education funding is 
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structured around the basic premise that individual school funding follows the 
student.  Utah calculated a “weighted pupil unit” (WPU) that awards funds 
differently by grade, etc.  As established earlier in this chapter, nearly all public 
school students attend the school that serves the area in which they live.  This 
structure leads to a funding mechanism that awards an individual public school 
funds based on little more than the population of students who live in their 
boundaries and thus attend their school.  In short, education funding in Utah for 
traditional public schools is essentially a function of an individual school’s 
enrollment.  When a student chooses to leave the traditional public school to 
enroll in a charter school, a portion of the “weighted pupil unit” leaves the 
traditional public school, depending on the grade and school district. (As 
mentioned, charter schools act as their own independent district, and therefore 
do not receive local funds but are almost entirely funded through statewide 
funds.)  Therefore, all else equal, a loss of enrollment would equate to a loss of 
funding for a traditional public school.  It is under this mechanism that the 
economic theories of competition can operate in Utah’s education market.  All 
else equal, a loss of enrollment equates to a loss of funding.  A short note here 
on some unique incentives is necessary.  Since only a portion of funding leaves 
the traditional public school when a student migrates to a charter school, this 
might be seen as beneficiary to the traditional public schools that face large class 
size constraints.  However, it remains clear that many traditional public school 
administrators do not see charter schools in this light, but rather they continue to 
view them strictly as competitive institutions that compete for limited education 
funding.  
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Public Education as a Monopoly 
 
 In acknowledging the unique aspects of public education that differentiate 
it from various other markets, we encounter what is frequently mentioned by 
critics to be dominant to the main issues in education today, namely that of the 
monopoly status of traditional public schools.  This last subsection of Chapter 3 
serves somewhat as a transition into Chapter 4, which addresses behavior under 
competition.  First, the characteristics of the education market must be described 
and addressed.    
As will be shown in Chapter 4, public education inherently has two 
characteristics that may cause it to be treated as a public good, namely non-
excludability and nonrivalry.  A specific aspect tying it to the definition of a public 
good is certainly the fact that it is available to all citizens who seek its services.  
Along with these features, however, come limited options.  When choosing to 
“consume” the services of public education, individuals are left with virtually no 
choice in regards to where to enroll their children.  Of course, this would be in the 
absence of enrolling in a private school which would incur significant monetary 
and time costs far above those of public schools.  As I have presented, and 
under Utah code 53a, individuals are essentially assigned a school that their 
children must attend, if they are to enroll in public education.   
The situation therefore in the public education market appears to resemble 
a monopoly, where the traditional public schools own all of the market.  Clearly, 
this is not an uncommon feature of public goods, but does create some 
inefficiencies and problems specifically in the market for education.  First, it has 
already been established that the structure of public education leaves parents 
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and students with little to no choice regarding the selection of individual schools, 
if they are to enroll in public schools.  Second, given the fact that the market for 
education is almost entirely owned by traditional public schools, the 
administrators and policy makers do not feel the risk of losing students (and 
subsequent funding) to competing schools.  In the absence of these risks, 
significant decreases to school quality arise as a very realistic possibility.  The 
cost of parental dissatisfaction to a local school administrator will not necessarily 
be financial (or an opportunity cost), but rather will come in a form resembling 
nothing more than verbal complaints.  Though, it must be noted that there likely 
exists some sort of dissatisfaction threshold at least on a school district level, 
when passed, causes significant changes to be made.  Such a threshold, 
however, would necessarily be much higher in the absence of competition.  
Lastly, traditional characteristics of a monopoly often involve barriers to entry.  
The public school market structure proves no exception, in the sense that there 
exist significant (indeed virtually impassable) barriers to entry into the education 
market, at least for the publicly-funded school market.  This is in contrast to a 
competitive market where firms are able to enter a market where profits are 
attractive with some ease.  Outside the newly formed possibilities through charter 
school laws, when education firms (new schools) wish to enter into the education 
market, they must to so as a private school, which will not receive public funds 
allocated for education.  This would essentially differentiate their product, making 
it outside the realm of substitutability.  Clearly and understandably, the market for 






In a “normative” rather than “positive” fashion, this chapter has sought to 
describe the realities and characteristics of the education market, with special 
emphasis on Utah’s education uniqueness and facets.  In doing so, it is intended 
to impress upon the reader the overall structure of education as a monopolistic 
one that may be opening itself up to a small degree of competition through the 
passage of charter school laws.  Before any empirical analysis is to be done, the 










Figure 3.1: Age Distribution - Utah and U.S. Utah U.S.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census.






















































































































The dynamics of school choice and charter competition depend 
substantially on the notion that human behavior may be altered by various 
incentives and pressures.  This idea is not foreign in discipline of Economics, but 
may be foreign to some in who have studied K-12 education.  In the context of 
education markets, the forces of competition, or even the threat of competition, 
may apply pressure on numerous agents to change their behavior.  These 
responses may take many forms and affect various levels of the school structure.  
For instance, when faced with the threat of losing substantial student enrollment 
to a nearby charter school, a school administrator may introduce new curriculum 
changes to entice students to stay.  The ultimate outcomes will inevitably depend 
on the degree to which administrators react to various market forces.  This 
chapter will first establish education as a public good, give an introduction to 
market forces and consumer behavior under competition, discuss substantially 
“Tiebout choice” theory in relation to the education market, address education 
applications viewed in a general equilibrium sense, and develop a general 
conceptual model for behavior in education when faced with competition.   
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Market Mechanisms and Education as a Public Good 
 
The economic theories that underlie market behavior must first be 
generally established in order to examine education as a market.  Standard 
economic theory provides the argument that competition forces firms to increase 
quality and/or decrease price.  This argument clearly is a function of the changes 
in behavior on the responding firm’s side.  The two important aspects here that 
vary are price and quality, both being tools at the firms’ disposal to attract 
potential revenue.  Not unlike the market structure of industrial firms, the market 
for education is also a function of the various characteristics of the buyers and 
sellers.  This includes the number and concentration of schools (sellers) in a 
given area, which effectively is a measure of market share.  Market forces that 
influence firms to increase quality and/or decrease price are mechanisms 
inherent in a consumer market, and are essentially driven by demand for their 
products.  Education policy, conversely, is not necessarily driven directly by the 
demand for its product, but rather by political and public mechanisms that will be 
outlined in this section. 
In applying various market structure principles to education, it is requisite 
first that I discuss a few notable differences in relation to industrial firms.  First, 
education is understood to be a public good and not directly a purely and 
individually consumed private good.  The benefits of education are not 
constrained strictly to each individual but can indeed be enjoyed by the broad 
public.  Certainly, the benefits of education cannot be excluded from the non-
payers of such good, thus satisfying the non-excludability condition.  Additionally, 
as a greater portion of any population becomes educated, the created benefits 
32 
received by others are not diminished, but may even prove to be more beneficial 
to others due to the increased levels of education.  The second condition of a 
public good, namely nonrivalry in consumption, is thus satisfied.  The overarching 
characteristic of education in this sense is its role as a positive externality for 
society.  This argument is made clear in the simple observation that a highly 
educated population brings about many benefits to their area, outside of the 
summed individual gains.   
This distinction of education as a public good is important to 
understanding the behavior within the education market and, most importantly, 
the justification for its publicly-funded financing structure.  When considered a 
public good, the burdens associated with funding education can be widely 
distributed across society, which will consequently lead to a more collective 
sense of ownership and responsibility over education obligations.  Nationwide, 
and in Utah specifically, public education is created in such a way to respond to 
political pressure as a public good where voters and constituents have collective 
control over local decisions.  This implies that local individuals, including parents 
of school-going children, do not necessarily have any direct decision-making 
power in public education, but must express their voice through local political 
mechanisms.  The directly-elected governing bodies include local school boards, 
state representatives, and state senators who all craft and direct education 
budgets, curriculum, and policies.  It is through these political mechanisms that 
education policy may be directed, but there also exist market-like mechanisms 






Direct voting is not, however, the only mechanism by which citizens can 
affect educational policy.  Constituent influence can also be felt and revealed by 
behavior – specifically by where individuals choose to live.  This theory, formally 
structured by Tiebout (1956), is commonly known today as “voting with your feet” 
and is incredibly useful and illustrative in describing the education market.   
Ultimately, the education market operating within the public school system 
is about aligning the supply of education with the demand for it.  In a sense, the 
demand for education can be understood in terms of a pattern of individual 
preferences, aggregated to each larger unit (i.e., families, neighborhoods, cities, 
counties, etc.).  Given the fact that education is foremost a public good, and that 
its funding sources are public, we can apply Tiebout’s (1956) theory of local 
expenditures directly to the education market. 
First, we must recognize an issue of determining the level of expenditures 
that exists in the public sector.  The main issue that was most famously argued 
by Musgrave and Samuelson, cited in Tiebout (1956), was the absence of a 
“market type” solution to determine the level of public good expenditures.  The 
resulting consequence was that a large portion of the national income was 
allocated in a “nonoptimal” way, at least when compared to the private sector.  
Tiebout seeks to show that these suboptimal public expenditure issues do not 
necessarily need to apply to local expenditures.  The distinction is an important 
and consequential one, indeed one that helped popularize Tiebout’s theory.   
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I start with the main problem that is key in the suboptimal expenditure 
allocations, namely that of aligning the consumers’ preferences with the proper 
allocation of public goods and services.  The purpose of the surrounding 
government, as Tiebout explains, is to essentially determine the level of public 
goods desired by the consumer and tax them accordingly.  The government’s 
revenue-expenditure pattern therefore must adapt to the consumers’ 
preferences.  Within this framework, it is easy to see the numerous problems 
potentially arising in the area of public expenditures and allocation.  Specifically, 
the heterogeneity of consumer preferences is far too vast to be satisfied by any 
homogenized public expenditure policy.  Moreover, the public expenditure 
problem is further complicated by the fact that true individual consumer 
preferences are not fully revealed.  As Tiebout notes, the solution to these 
problems is executed through political mechanisms whereby public expenditures 
are based off of the preference patterns of a “typical voter.”  This mechanism 
clearly leads to sub-optimal public expenditure allocation, further exacerbated as 
consumer preferences become more different (or further) from the mean “typical 
voter.”  A complicating layer added to this problem is an “ability-to-pay” principle 
inherent in the progressive tax structure introduced on the revenue side of the 
public sector side.   
Perhaps Tiebout’s most prominent contribution was the clear distinction 
between centralized (federal or national) expenditure patterns and local ones.  
The relationship between centralized policies and local ones are a matter of one-
to-many, with the number of locales being many in number.  While centralized 
expenditure allocation must be adapted to fit the “typical voter,” Tiebout notes 
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that local expenditure allocation is more stably set.  This fact creates the most 
essential distinction between centralized and local expenditures precisely 
because it allows the consumers (voters) to choose between locales based off of, 
to no small degree, the expenditure patterns of the local community.  In choosing 
a community in which to live, citizens undoubtedly seek areas with expenditure 
patterns that best reflect their own set of preferences.  By doing so, the citizens 
will be able to “vote with their feet,” as has the principle been known since 
Tiebout’s infamous work. 
The closeness with which a citizen can match his own set of public 
preferences with that of a community will depend on the number of communities 
available, as well as the degree of mobility available to him to locate to 
alternative areas.  Therefore, as Tiebout admits, there will likely remain a degree 
of suboptimal expenditure allocation due to both the scarcity of communities and 
the large number of citizens.  This limitation, however, should not diminish the 
effectiveness of the argument itself, nor the usefulness of the theory applied to 
education markets.  The ability to match consumer-voters’ preferences will 
therefore be a matter of degree.   
Specifically because of its publicly-funded nature, this theory proves very 
persuasive when applied to the market for education.  This is especially true for 
the Utah case when studying the effects of emerging charter school competition.  
By allowing the formation of public school alternatives, another layer of public 
expenditures is added to each community, adding to the variability of expenditure 
patterns.  Alternative communities can now attract more citizens who seek the 
kind of choices in education that charter schools have to offer.  The process by 
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which consumer-voters can cause policy changes is made possible through 2 
main dynamics: choices and threats.   
With an increase in the variety of communities available to them, and 
without relaxing the reasonable constraints of distance and/or mobility, citizens 
are more likely to find an area that best matches their own set of public 
preferences.  It should be clear to any reader that offerings in education are at or 
near the top of most all citizens’ priority lists when deciding on the community in 
which to locate.  Seeing that potential tax revenue and growth are a function of 
constituent populations, individual communities have nontrivial incentives to offer 
appealing education expenditure patterns, and thus attract more tax payers.  It is 
shown through this mechanism that citizens are able to vote not only in the strict 
legal sense, but also “with their feet” by selecting the community in which to live.  
This mechanism grants persuasive power to the potential tax-paying citizens, 
and indeed includes real incentives for community policy makers to offer 
matching patterns of education demanded by said populations.   These effects 
will quickly be felt by the individual schools and school districts, as they must 
compete with neighboring communities to satisfy the expenditure patterns 
demanded.  
The second dynamic through which consumer-voters can cause policy 
changes is simply by threatening to move to a different community.  This point 
has been persuasively argued by Holmes, et al. (2003) in relating the Tiebout 
theory to school choice.  When parents find themselves dissatisfied with various 
aspects of a local school system, they can threaten to dis-enroll their children, 
and leave the community, leaving behind a piece of funding proportional to that 
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single family tax share.  Well known are the typical costs associated with moving 
communities, including nonfinancial social costs, but school offerings and school 
quality are such a concern to parents that these threats must, in most cases, be 
considered credible.  The occurrence of threatening to dis-enroll from a school is 
a more common mechanism of bringing about changes in school policy than 
those of actually selecting alternative communities and following through to the 
threat by actually moving.  
Tiebout’s theory of matching public expenditure patterns has been shown 
to be valuable in exploring the effects of increasing competition in education 
markets (for specific examples, see Holmes, et al. (2003)), and will be used in 
the theoretical framework of my own research.  The theory is valuable precisely 
due to the mechanism by which charter school emergence, by definition, 
increases parental choice for education.  This consequentially will lead to greater 





The principles contained within general equilibrium theory can also prove 
to be effective in studying education markets and student outcomes, precisely 
due to the numerous mechanisms of student sorting and resource distribution.  
Hoxby (2003) has noted the importance of including these principles of general 
equilibrium by arguing the need for solving three simultaneous equilibria: 
equilibrium in the market for schooling, equilibrium in the market for housing, and 
equilibrium in the labor market.  All three of these areas are critical for any 
individual community, and are certainly a factor in education policy in Utah.  
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Clearly, while this research specifically addresses the competitive effects in the 
market for schooling, it is important to provide context through discussion of the 
other markets that are inherently related to education.  
Viewing education markets within the framework of general equilibrium is 
also an argument made persuasively by Goldhaber and Eide (2003).  In a review 
of methodological approaches to studying education competition, the authors 
explicitly separate the two structures of equilibrium analysis, namely general and 
partial.  A substantial amount of school choice research, they point out, has gone 
into viewing the competitive effects on the entire school system, in a general 
equilibrium sense, but only measuring those effects in a partial equilibrium sense.  
In order to fully understand the competitive impacts, they argue that a general 
equilibrium framework should be used.  This essentially requires an analysis of 
the competitive impacts of new education competition on the entire school 
system.  Ultimately they argue that, for increased choice to have an impact on 
the education market, it must cause positive changes in the entire public school 
system.   
This argument is persuasive, in no small degree, due to the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of K-12 students will remain in the traditional public 
schools.  Utah is no exception to this fact, indeed adding a greater need for 
research to be done on the competitive effects of charter schools on the 
achievement of the students who remain in the traditional public schools.  
Overall, charter schools have fulfilled a need for additional public school options, 
but are clearly not intended to replace traditional public schools in their entirety.  
The overwhelming majority of K-12 students will indeed remain in the traditional 
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public schools.  By incorporating the general equilibrium principles, the models I 
use will be more complete in the sense that they look at the impacts on the entire 
school system.  My research therefore answers the more broad questions related 
to students who remain in the traditional public school system.   
Another methodological critique made by Goldhaber and Eide (2003) is 
the need for research to test across areas with varying degrees of competition 
when testing the general equilibrium effects of education competition.  My 
research comprehensively covers these differing degrees by utilizing numerous 
approaches to measure charter competition.  Moreover, the statistical models will 
be applied to various subsets that differ in population and density.  The 





 In order to study the competitive impacts of charter schools, it is 
necessary to develop a conceptual framework through which individuals’ 
behavior will plausibly work.  Following the same general approach as Holmes, et 
al. (2003), I consider a general conceptual model for school behavior following 
competitive pressures from charter schools.  For purposes of simplicity, and 
considering the fact that my data are school-level, I will approach the conceptual 
model from the viewpoint that the agent is the school principal.  However, it must 
be noted that the acting agent in Utah’s education market might also be a district 





 ܧሺݍሺ݁ሻ, ݌ሻ                                  (4.1) 
 
 
where a school’s enrollment, ܧ, is a function of school quality, ݍሺ݁ሻ, and the price 
of attending a competing charter school, ݌. Further, school quality, ݍሺ݁ሻ, is a 
function of the effort exerted by the school principal.  Since I am working within 
the context of the public school system, this conceptual framework makes more 
sense by including the price of the competing good (price of attending a charter 
school).  Next, consider the utility function of the school principal, 
 
 





where his/her utility, ܷ, is a function of the school’s enrollment, ܧ, and his/her 
effort exerted, ݁. 
 In this framework, it should be clear that an individual school’s enrollment, 
ܧ, is increasing both in school quality, ݍሺ݁ሻ, and in the price of attending a 
competing charter school, ݌.  Moreover, the agent’s utility, ܷ, is increasing in 
school enrollment, ܧ, but decreasing in his/her effort exerted, ݁.  As established, 
Utah’s education system is such that an individual school’s funding is directly tied 
to its enrollment levels.  Thus, the funding incentives for the agent heavily involve 










where essentially he or she can only alter enrollment, ܧ, through changes to 
school quality, ݍሺ݁ሻ, by increased levels of effort, ݁.  Of course, the price of 
attending a competing charter school, ݌, is of interest, but treated as exogenous 
to the agent. 
 The first order condition is 
 
 




and rearranging produces 
 
 





which shows that, at this level of maximization, the effort to increase enrollment 
equals the marginal disutility from exerting effort.  What this conceptual model 
portrays is that as enrollment in the traditional public school increases, the agent 
has less incentive to exert effort to affect quality.  More abstractly, this notion is 
consistent with Tiebout choice, in that there is a decreasing amount incentive for 
schools to improve quality if enrollment (and subsequent funding) is already high 
or already increasing.  These notions are, of course, strictly related to monetary 
incentives and exclude any nonfinancial motivating factors. 
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 Again, this general conceptual approach was done persuasively by 
Holmes, et al. (2003), but is helpful in describing any behavior by the school 
principal (or any higher level school administrator) for my own research of Utah’s 
education.  The rationale for including this conceptual model in my research is to 
clearly frame the potential behavior changes by the agent in response to any 
competition.  As enrollment is partially a function of the price of attending a 
competing charter school, it only becomes a meaningful factor when ݌ is such 
that the competition is substitutable.  In other words, an agent’s behavior is likely 
only affected by competition when the price of attending the competition is low.  
For my research, I include various measures of charter school competition, most 
of which involve distance from the traditional public school to a nearby charter 
school as a proxy for the price of attending the charter school.  Further details 
and rationale for using distance as a measure of competition are provided in 
Chapter 5.  Suffice to note in this section that competition will only solicit a 
reaction when the school is a close substitute. 
 This general conceptual model also reveals the incentives created by 
charter school competition.  As a nearby charter school becomes more and more 
competitive, the school agent is faced with the possibility of losing enrollment and 
subsequent funding.  Therefore, market-like incentives are created by 
competition for the agent to increase the quality of the traditional public school.  
Specifically, in terms of educational changes, this may involve additional staff 
training, curriculum improvements, or any other instructional improvements, in 
response to increased competition.  To this end, it is the purpose of this research 
to explore and test these theories with solid empirical data. 
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Actual competition from a nearby charter school may not be the only 
mechanism by which agent behavior is changed.  It is entirely possible that the 
mere threat of competition may be substantial enough to elicit policy responses 
from school administrators.  Hoxby (2003) notes that, within the education 
market, school performance will depend on the availability of alternative schools, 
and not necessarily whether the parents actually use those alternatives.  This 
notion is fully consistent with the principles of behavioral economics and is also 
argued by Holmes et al. (2003).  This research allows for such behavioral 
mechanisms as it explores the effects of the availability of alternative schools on 





The degree to which competition from charter schools is felt is certainly a 
function of residents’ ability to exercise Tiebout choice over their traditional public 
schools and their school districts.  Recalling from Holmes, et al. (2003), the 
existence of alternative options for public schooling gives parents a credible 
threat against schools who continually fail to make improvements, or continually 
fail to offer any response to parents’ dissatisfaction.  Utah has a unique case of 
having disproportionately large school districts, which ultimately decrease the 
number of districts from which to choose.  For example, as mentioned in Holmes, 
et al.(2003), North Carolina has 117 traditional school districts, Michigan has 
over 500, while Utah has only 40 (as of 2009).  Moreover, the top five school 
districts contain approximately 50% of K-6 public school students in Utah.  This 
low number and large size of Utah’s school districts will certainly impact the 
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market structure of education in the sense that parents will have a diminished 
degree of school district choice, in relation to other charter states.   
On a more abstract level, and as Booker, et al. (2008) note, the mere fact 
of a charter school law passing may be enough of a motivating factor in a 
traditional public school’s decision to respond to potential competition.  In other 
words, and in a preemptive sense, an individual traditional public school may in 
fact respond to the threat of competition without (or before) any charter schools 
even surface nearby.  These market-like motivating factors will indeed be a 
function of the perceived sense of competition that is held by a school 
administrator.  The very premise upon which these notions are formed is entirely 
consistent with Tiebout’s theory of public choice.  A critical element in the theory 
is the mechanism that is operated by a simple threat of leaving the locale and 
subsequently taking potential future funding.  Administrative decisions will 
certainly be influenced by perceived threats, which are clearly validated by 
historical reality.  As Hoxby (2003) notes, the threats to leave an individual public 
school by dissatisfied parents must be credible if they are to have any realistic 
effect.   
The reality of the current education system is such that it is quite unlikely 
that charter schools will ever educate a substantial part of any state’s student 
population, a point even acknowledged by charter advocates.  Yet, as noted by 
Buddin and Zimmer (2005), charter schools’ most effective impacts will likely be 
felt at the structural or systemic level of education.  This is accomplished by 
charters infusing market-like incentives to the traditional public schools that 
eventually permeate through the entire system.  Therefore, charter schools 
45 
potentially will have their greatest impact in the long-run not necessarily on the 
students who choose to enroll in their services, but rather on the majority of 















 An essential characteristic of any meaningful research is its unique 
contribution to the existing literature.  As outlined in my literature review, found in 
Chapter 2, and considering the tremendous growth of charter schools, further 
empirical research is certainly warranted in Utah.  In order to unique contribute to 
the existing literature, I present the main characteristics of my research.  The first 
comes in the form of a newly-created and unique longitudinal data set, while the 
second is analysis of the empirical data through various statistical approaches.  
Taken together, these characteristics of my research will define its unique 
contribution to the literature.  Justification for using the various statistical 
approaches is grounded in the literature, and properly cited where necessary.   
  A common limitation in any study on education outcomes is derived from 
the fact that the data are non-experimental in nature.  To test the impact of 
various policies on student outcomes, we must utilize the existing empirical data.  
A short note on the limitations to the data set is worth mentioning here.  Not 
unlike most social science research, economic analysis applied to education 
cannot create pure experiments.  In light of these realities, researchers are 
forced to explore the existing data within this constrained environment.  My 
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research of the competitive effects of charter schools is no different, where 
existing empirical data is used, and limitations are dealt with using robust 
statistical measures.  Greater limitations exist on the reliability of the test scores 
used, and will be addressed in a later section. 
 
 
New Data Set 
 
 In order to uniquely contribute to the existing literature, I have created a 
new longitudinal data set with numerous parameters to measure the effects of 
charter competition.  I have done this by combining two large authoritative data 
sets.   
First, I have obtained school-level criterion-referenced test (CRT) score 
data from the Utah State Office of Education for the academic years 2005-2006 
through 2010-2011.  These tests are given in three subjects: Math, Science, and 
Language Arts.  Two measures for each subject were obtained: First, a school-
level average score for the subject, and second, the percentage of total students 
who are deemed proficient in such subject for each school.  Therefore, my 
dataset contains two measures of 3 subjects for 6 years.  These data provide 
overall indicators on how well each individual school is preparing their students 
on those 3 subjects and allows for strong comparative models. 
 Second, I have obtained school-level demographic and enrollment data 
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  These particular data 
serve as a supplement to the CRT score data set and, when combined, form a 
rich data set on which to perform robust empirical analysis.  The NCES data also 
allow for the statistical models to properly control for numerous factors outside 
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the scope of my research, but are indeed important to include in the models for 
completeness.   
 
 
Measures of Competition 
 
 In a competitive market, each firm basically has two separate tools at its 
disposal – price and quality.  In an education market, the distance to a charter 
school represents the price of attending it.  This is due to the complete lack of 
any sort of tuition or other costs associated with enrollment.  Justification for 
using distance as the cost of attending a nearby charter school is strongly 
supported by the literature.  Holmes et al. (2003) cite numerous specific empirical 
evidence of using distance as a relevant cost, a principle dating back to 
Hotelling’s well-known letter written to the National Park Service in 1947 
discussing distance as an instrument of price.  Its use has also been shown 
effective specifically to the education literature, as portrayed in Goldring and 
Hausman (1999), where they find distance as an important factor for parents 
when choosing between alternative schools.     
As the distance to the nearest charter school decreases, the price of 
enrolling in said school effectively decreases.  When the price of attending the 
competing school decreases, relative to the traditional public school, its degree of 
substitutability increases.  The degree of competition is therefore increased as 
the number of competing schools rise and as their distance to the students 
decrease.  Competitive pressure felt on the schools administrators also increases 
as the probability of students enrolling elsewhere happens to be negatively 
associated with the distance to the nearest competing school.  Since public 
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schools’ price components are essentially fixed, when competition affects the 
price of education, competing schools are forced to respond by changing the 
other constraint – quality.  Seeing that the price of attending a charter school is 
effectively a function of its distance to the potential students, and in order to 
include this in my data set, I have calculated the distance from each traditional 
public school to each charter school in their county.  The distance measure is 
calculated “as the crow flies,” and is in miles.   
In the school choice literature, two basic approaches are taken with 
respect to using distance as a competition measure.  First, a linear approach can 
be taken that measures the number of competing schools within a particular 
distance from the traditional public school.  This method allows for the detection 
and influence of two effects.  First, for the effect of any competition from a nearby 
charter school (in a dichotomous fashion), and second, for the measure of 
magnitude of competition to increase as more charter schools exist nearby.  This 
linear approach has been taken by Sass (2006) and Bettinger (2005).  Second, a 
nonlinear approach to measuring competition can be taken where a series of 
variables indicate after a particular competitive threshold has been reached.  The 
use of a dummy variable to capture the level of competition is argued by Hoxby 
(2003), where she states that the impact of competition should not necessarily be 
measured linearly, but will be negligible at low levels and become more 
pronounced as charter school enrollment reaches a threshold of competition – 
around 6% of district’s enrollment.  This method is also utilized by Bettinger 
(2005) and Ni (2009) in their analysis of charter school competition.  Hoxby 
(2003) argues that competition from charter schools is likely only observable after 
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6% or more of a district’s enrollment belongs to charter schools.  This non-linear 
approach seems to be an appropriate methodological avenue, indeed one that 
can be grounded in industrial organization theory.  The issue in applying this 
particular measure to school choice in Utah arises due to the different structure 
of school districts.  As previously outlined, school districts in Utah are 
disproportionately large in relation to other states.  This leads to smaller units of 
analysis on the district level and a much large number of schools included in 
each district.  Still, the single use of this metric will be one part of my overall 
methodological approach of measuring competition. 
 For robust results, and consistency, my method of measuring competition 
involves a variety of approaches and metrics.  First, I follow the basic structure 
utilized by Sass (2006), and others, where he uses a series of variables that 
indicate how many charter schools are found within 2.5, 5, and 10 miles of the 
traditional public school.  My method measures the number of charter schools 
within 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 miles of the traditional public school.  This method 
allows for the effect of any charter schools within a given distance as well as the 
measure of magnitude of competition to increase as more charter schools exist 
nearby.  Second, I include the distance (in miles) to the nearest charter school.  
Including this measure appropriately accounts for the underlying theory that as 
the distance to the competing charter school increases, the degree of 
competition felt by the traditional public school should is diminished.  
Appropriately so, we would expect the correlation of such variables to be 
negative.  Third, following the methodology of Hoxby (2003), I include a series of 
dichotomous variables indicating when 5%, 6%, and 7% of a school district’s 
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enrollment belongs to charter schools.  Ultimately, a 5% threshold works best for 
the data.  For completeness here, I also use the continuous measure of a 
district’s enrollment belonging to charter schools.  Finally, I use a set of 
dichotomous variables indicating when there exists three or four charter schools 
within 5 miles of the traditional public school.  This particular measurement of 
competition is used persuasively by Booker, et al. (2008) and incorporates the 
notion of dichotomously comparing traditional public schools that have 
experienced charter competition with those that have not.  Essentially, it serves 
as an indicator of charter competition penetration into the education market.  
Together, these multiple measures of competition will serve as a check for 
completeness after controlling for school-level characteristics that influence 
achievement.  
 Using distance as a measurement of competition may expose the results 
to some form of bias.  In their excellent review of education competition 
methodology, Goldhaber and Eide (2003) note that the reliability of results 
certainly will depend, in some degree, on the appropriateness of the instruments 
used.  I am confident however in the methodology used due to its wide use in the 
existing literature as well as the theoretical principles underpinning their use.  
Although unique in a few key aspects, the market for education is similar to any 
other competitive market, where they must compete with substitutable goods 
nearby.  This fact is certainly clear when schools become open to competition, as 
is the case when charter schools enter the market.  These distinctions and 
similarities have already been discussed, but indeed are worth mentioning again 
in relation to the quantitative methodology used.   
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Test Score Data 
 
 Although its effectiveness is still open to debate, grade-specific 
standardized tests remain the most widely-accepted proxy for student 
achievement.  For my particular study, school-level criterion-referenced test 
(CRT) score data was obtained from the Utah State Office of Education for the 
academic years 2005-2006 through 2010-2011.  The CRT scores measure three 
subjects – Language Arts, Mathematics, and Science.  The scores also come in 
two different forms – the individual school average score and the percentage of 
the school that is considered proficient in each subject.  These Criterion 
Referenced Tests are administered to each individual public school in Utah and 
have been consistent in both methodology and use for the reported years 
included in my study, proving to be a reliable and consistent instrument for 
academic achievement.  By having a broad set of academic indicators, the 
empirical analysis through econometric models will be very robust, ultimately 
leading to strong and persuasive results.   
Given that my research studies a six year time period, the point of interest 
is the dynamics of these CRT scores.  An often overlooked aspect in the 
empirical literature is that of historical trends.  This point is most effectively 
argued by Hoxby (2003), where she notes the importance of measuring the 
trends of education scores, and not only the levels.  My research will follow the 
same notion by incorporating a fixed-effect approach that accounts for the 
historical trends of CRT scores before competitive effects are introduced, as well 
as direct controls for any year effects that might exist.  Moreover, by including 
different measures of competition, namely the dichotomous variable indicating 
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when a traditional public school faces strong charter competition, the historical 





 The central question of interest is essentially how increased competition 
affects the quality of the competing traditional public schools.  The measurement 
of quality comes in the form of the changes to the trends of school-level CRT 
scores.  As explained, my method of measuring competition involves using an 
instrument for price of attendance, namely that of distance from the traditional 
public school to the nearby charter schools.  Since my approach measures 
individual schools over a period of 6 years, it will take on a panel structure, 
containing two subscripts.  In a general sense, academic achievement therefore 
can be described as: 
 
 




where ܥܴ ௜ܶ௧ is the average Criterion Referenced Test (CRT) score for school ݅ 
in time ݐ,  ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of time-specific characteristics of school ݅ that influence 
achievement, including the percentage of a school’s enrollment that is Hispanic, 
the percentage of enrollment that is Free/Reduced Lunch eligible, a school’s 
student-to-faculty ratio, and the school’s district size in terms of total enrollment 
(in thousands), and ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ is a variable indicating the number of charter 
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schools within 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 10 miles of school ݅ in time ݐ, or one of the other 
measures of competition. 
 After controlling for the various school characteristics, equation (5.1) 
measures school effectiveness or productivity.  Ni (2009) appropriately notes that 
this measure can be read as achievement per dollar spent, after the school 
demographic and spending variables are properly accounted and controlled for.  
Hoxby (2003) also articulates academic achievement trends in these terms of 
achievement per dollar spent. 
 The measure of competition found in equation (5.1) takes into account the 
effect of having any charter school within X miles, while still allowing at the same 
time different levels of effects for each additional charter school within X miles.  I 
argue that this methodology is more effective, and ultimately more persuasive, 
due to the underlying theory of marginal competition.  Namely, as the number of 
charter schools within X miles of the traditional public school increases, so does 
the level and severity of competition.  Moreover, this methodology is not only 
appropriate in terms of economic theory but is also widely used in the school 
choice literature (see Bettinger 2005 and Sass 2006).   
 Estimating equation (5.1) through OLS would prove to be problematic due 
to the panel nature of the data.  A simple OLS approach does not properly take 
into account the lagged achievement effects (namely, ܥܴ ௜ܶ௧ will partially be a 
function of ܥܴ ௜ܶ௧ିଵ).  Moreover, a pooled OLS approach assumes that all the 
other variables not accounted for in the model are uncorrelated with competition.  
This is an improper and improbable assumption given the fact that charter school 
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location will likely be, at least in part, a function of such traditional public school 
characteristics (see the following section). These limitations and complications 
are addressed in the context of charter competition and location by Ni (2009) and 
addressed in a technical sense by Baltagi (2001).  
 A more complete statistical methodology should include a fixed-effect 
approach, which decomposes the error term ߝ௜௧ into an unobservable school-
specific effect, ߤ௜ and an idiosyncratic error that changes over time, ߭௜௧.  This 
idiosyncratic error is considered to be the “usual” residual and therefore is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with ܺ, homoscedastic, and 
have a mean equal to zero (see Baltagi, 2001).  The school-specific and time-
invariant effect, ߤ௜, accounts for any fixed underlying differences in school quality 
and effectiveness and differs between units but, for any particular unit, is 
constant.  It also may include historical aspects that influence, among other 
things, charter school location.  On the other hand, ߭௜௧ differs between units as 
well as between time observations.  Finally, I also add a year-specific effect, ߠ௧, 
to the error component, that will account for any error effects that come from a 
specific year in the observed range.  Given the empirical nature of this data, it is 
important to properly account for these year-specific effects that might influence 
achievement, a point of special emphasis in the education literature.  Similar to 
Buddin and Zimmer (2005), the overall error component becomes ߝ௜௧ ൌ 	 ߤ௜ ൅
߭௜௧ ൅ 	ߠ௧.   
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 When working with longitudinal data, a random-effects model approach is 
often taken.  However, in this particular instance, estimation through a random-
effects model would assume that the location of the charter school is necessarily 
random, an implausible and unlikely assumption.  On the other hand, a fixed-
effect approach is more appropriately used in this research due to the school-
specific and time-invariant effect, ߤ௜, which is allowed to be correlated with 
ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧.  Effectively, this approach allows the location of the charter school 
to be related to the unobserved differences among traditional public schools, 
which is an important component of the estimation due to the fact that charter 
schools often locate in areas where traditional public school student achievement 
is low and parental dissatisfaction is high.  Alternatively, a random-effects model 
assumes that  ߤ௜ is a random variable that is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables, which is certainly a false assumption for the charter school situation in 
Utah.  This particular fixed-effects approach applied to longitudinal education 
data not only operates under reasonable assumptions, but is also commonly 
used in the literature (see Booker et al. (2003), Bifulco and Ladd (2006), Buddin 
and Zimmer (2005), and Ni (2009)).   
 With the error term decomposed, the equation then becomes: 
 
 




which is identical to equation (5.1), except for the decomposed error term, 
ߝ௜௧ ൌ 	ߤ௜ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅	ߠ௧ .  By separating the different error effects, we can 
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distinguish the unobserved school heterogeneity that affects student 
achievement, namely ߤ௜.  Estimation of the year-specific error effect is done 
directly through the inclusion of dichotomous year variables (similar to Buddin 
and Zimmer (2005)).   
 Following Holmes (2003) and Sass (2006), my model takes the form 
where the current school achievement is a function of lagged achievement, 
various measures of charter school competition (distance), and a vector of time-
specific school characteristics that influence achievement.  As stated, estimation 
of the model is performed primarily through a fixed-effect linear regression for 
panel data that allows for time-variant competitive effects as well as time-
invariant demographics (fixed-effects).  This particular fixed-effects approach 
applied to longitudinal education data is commonly used in the literature (see 
Booker et al. 2008, Bifulco and Ladd 2004, Sass 2006, and Ni 2009), and serves 
as a strong statistical vehicle for my empirical data.  
 
 
Charter School Location and Endogeneity 
 
 Charter school location could prove to be problematic for statistical 
estimation, essentially due to its endogenous nature.  Since the passing of 
charter school laws in Utah, charter schools are allowed to locate at the founding 
members’ discretion.  Of course, the choice of location will be a function of local 
demand for charter schools.  The governing bodies deciding charter school 
location will undoubtedly find areas in which demand for alternative schools will 
be sufficient to populate a new charter school.  In theory, charter schools are 
likely to emerge in areas that exhibit an overall high level of dissatisfaction for the 
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traditional public schools.  This dissatisfaction could clearly be due to many 
different factors, but it is not unreasonable to assume that most involve 
dissatisfaction with the level of educational quality perceived by parents.  Herein 
lays the potential problem of endogeneity.  If areas with failing schools (or at 
least a lower level of achievement relative to other areas) attract more and more 
charter schools, then certainly those traditional public schools would be on a 
declining achievement trend anyway.  This scenario has the potential of 
exhibiting some feedback effects with respect to charter competition and 
academic achievement.  However, considering these potential issues derived 
from charter school location, the statistical estimation approaches used should 
indeed deal explicitly with the inherent possibility of any endogeneity effects (see 
Holmes 2003 and Sass 2006). 
 Related to this discussion of charter school location is an excellent piece 
by Glomm, et al. (2005), where they examine the emergence of charter schools 
in Michigan and California.  Since the dependent variable used (the number of 
charter schools within a district) is a non-negative integer value, they estimate 
their model using a Poisson regression.  Their results suggest that charter 
schools tend to locate in areas where populations are racially and educationally 
diverse.  Moreover, they report that the overall quality of surrounding traditional 
public schools appears to have a large effect on charter school location. 
 For completeness regarding these possibilities, I followed the approach of 
Glomm, et al. by constructing a Poisson regression to estimate the potential 
factors leading to charter school location in Utah, where the number of charter 
schools within a given distance acts as the independent variable.  My results 
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initially show evidence that charter schools are more likely to emerge in areas 
where achievement is already high in Language Arts and Science, but low in 
Math.  These results, however, diminish substantially once I directly control for 
any year effects (by explicitly including dichotomous year variables).  Charter 
school location, although important to briefly address in my overall methodology, 
still remains outside the scope of my research.  Further investigation into charter 
school location, similar to Glomm, et al. (2005), would continue to profit the 
education literature.   
Finally, the possibility of endogeneity is not only of importance to the 
statistical approaches, but also to the theoretical structure regarding charter 
school location, where student self-selection may also be an issue.  After locating 
near a traditional public school, it is entirely possible, and may even be highly 
probable in some areas, that the newly-emerged charter school attracts relatively 
higher (or lower) achieving students.  These effects, if true, would have the 
potential to bias the coefficient estimates of my results.  A full review and 
analysis of this nature of student self-selection is dealt with thoroughly in Chapter 





 The data used in my research, although carrying the same accepted 
limitations of any empirical analysis, is derived from reliable and rich sources.  
The empirical models and statistical approaches are used commonly in the 
economics literature, the education literature, and all operate under reasonable 
assumptions.  Perhaps more importantly, they are grounded and supported by 
60 
the underlying economic theories.  Together with this newly-created dataset, 
these empirical estimations should prove interesting and meaningful results.  
Ultimately, they will uniquely contribute to the existing literature, and provide 















 As outlined in the previous chapter, the unique dataset that I have 
constructed includes a large number of variables measuring competition and 
controlling for demographic and school-specific differences.  In all, I have 
executed over 200 separate fixed-effect regression models, which have 
produced a wide variety of estimates and results.  In this chapter, I discuss the 
empirical results, interpret some of the coefficient estimates, address the 
potential issues of endogeneity and student self-selection, and discuss some of 
the limitations associated with the statistical approaches.  Broad conclusions and 





 In Chapters 3 and 4, I have established that Utah’s education structure 
inherently differs from other states in terms of district size, number of schools, 
and charter school growth.  The demographics of Utah are an important factor in 
these discussions, as they are in any research in education, and will serve as 
context for my empirical results.  In presenting my empirical results, I will cover 
four different model subsets.  In doing so, I explore the various nuances of the 
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different subsets, as well as the overarching patterns and trends across the 







 I begin first by running the empirical models over all predefined K-6 
schools in Utah.  The benefits of this statewide approach are twofold.  First, it 
increases the sample size, thus improving the potential accuracy of the 
estimates, and suppressing any potential outlier influence.  Second, and more 
importantly, by running the models for all schools across the state, both schools 
that have experienced charter competition and those that have not are included, 
thus creating a perfect control group for the estimations.  This latter point is 
important for the theoretical structure of my research as well as the statistical 
soundness thereof. 
 As outlined in Chapter 5, each of the three test subjects contains two 
measures - the average test score for each school, and the percent of each 
school’s enrollment that is deemed proficient in each subject.  These measures 
have remained consistent across the specified time period.  Also, recall that I use 
11 measures of competition for each of these test score indicators.  In all, this 
produces 11 model results presented on each of the six tables.  Each table 
contains coefficient estimates for the 11 measures of competition, school-specific 
demographic controls (percent of enrollment that are Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible and the percent of enrollment that are Hispanic), the constant, and the 
overall R squared for the model.  Direct year dummy variables are included in 
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each model but not explicitly reported.  Moreover, the district size and student-to-
faculty ratio variable coefficients were consistently negligible and not statistically 
significant, and thus not reported (but included in each model for proper control).  
Lastly, a note on the school districts is necessary.  During the specified time 
period in the data, 2005 – 2010, the Jordan school district split into two separate 
districts.  The Utah State Office of Education did not yet have test scores for the 
newly created district (Canyons).  As a result, I have excluded the 28 traditional 
public schools belonging in that district for the entire time period.  For 
consistency, I also excluded the three charter schools that operate within the 
district’s geographic boundaries. 
Tables 6.1 through 6.6 present the fixed-effects model results ran on all 
predefined K-6 schools statewide.  Starting with the percent proficient dependent 
variables, we see positive gains from charter competition for Language Arts 
scores (Table 6.1).  The coefficients are all positive (except for the variable 
measuring the distance to the nearest charter school, which is negative, 
suggesting positive gains to increased competition) and most strongly shown 
with the strong charter competition dummy indicator that indicates when there 
exist at least three charter schools within 5 miles of the traditional public school.  
This particular measure of competition was argued by Booker, et al. (2008) and 
compares the traditional public schools that have experienced strong charter 
competition to those who have not.  This measure essentially indicates charter 
penetration into each traditional public school’s market.  Ultimately, and 
according to the models, having at least three charter schools within 5 miles 
equates to a 1.5% increase in the portion of students who are proficient in 
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Language Arts, ceteris paribus.  An increase of 1.5% is indeed no trivial gain, for 
it is more than one third of one standard deviation for Language Arts proficiency 
gains during the specified time period.  For further context, consider that during 
the 2005-2010 time period, the average Language Arts proficiency gain was only 
0.07 percentage points.  Looking at the distance indicator variables, we see the 
strongest competitive effects occurring around 2 to 3 miles from the traditional 
public school.  According to the model, every additional charter school within 2 
miles of a traditional public school is equated with a gain of about 1% in the 
portion of students who are proficient in Language Arts.  Again, a 1% increase 
equates to approximately one quarter of one standard deviation for Language 
Arts proficiency gains during the specified time period.  Lastly, the nonlinear 
dichotomous measure of a competitive threshold shows positive gains in 
Language Arts.  The school-specific demographic controls all have expected 
signs, and are statistically significant for almost all models.  It is worth noting that 
the percent of a school’s enrollment that is Hispanic was more consistent and 
statistically significant than the percent of a school’s enrollment that is 
Free/Reduced Lunch eligible.  Again, these demographic variables act as proper 
controls for the various models, and are indeed important for accurate estimates.  
Finally, the overall R squared figures for Language arts models range from 0.52 
to 0.64. 
Moving to Math results, found in Table 6.2, we see somewhat negative 
effects from charter competition on the portion proficient in Math.  First, it is worth 
noting the differences in Math trends in relation to Language Arts.  The average 
gains in the portion proficient in Math are not gains at all but rather are declines 
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statewide.  Accordingly, the coefficient estimates will be treated somewhat 
differently.  From the model results, we see an overall negative effect of charter 
school competition on the portion proficient in Math for traditional public schools.  
The negative effect is statistically significant for most, but not all, measures of 
competition.  Again we see strongest results from the dichotomous variable 
indicating when three or more charters exist within 5 miles of the traditional public 
school.  According to the model, having at least three charter schools within 5 
miles of a traditional public school is associated with a decrease in the portion of 
enrolled students proficient in Math by 1.2%, ceteris paribus, which equates to 
less than one quarter of one standard deviation.  This is significant at the 5% 
confidence level but not at the 1%.  Interestingly, the estimates for the nonlinear 
dichotomous threshold variable carries a statistically significant positive 
coefficient, suggesting gains of about 1% to Math proficiency for traditional public 
schools who belong in districts where charter school enrollment exceeds 5% of 
public school district enrollment.  This peculiarity may exist due to the fact that 
these models were executed across all schools statewide.  By doing so, 
numerous districts were included in the models, some that passed this threshold 
and some that did not.  It is entirely possible that a number of overall districts saw 
a benefit from charter competition on Math scores, while individual traditional 
public schools experienced negative effects from charter schools competing in 
close proximity to them.  Lastly, we again note that the demographic controls all 
contained the expected signs, consistent with the Language Arts models, while 
the Math models had slightly lower R squared figures, ranging from 0.38 to 0.53. 
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Lastly, I address the model estimates of charter competition on Science 
proficiency, found in Table 6.3.  The estimates from the fixed-effect models for 
Science paint a less clear picture, having negative coefficient signs but very little 
statistical significance.  There were only two measures of competition that 
provided statistically significant results, the number of charter schools within 3 
miles and the number within 5 miles of the traditional public school.  Both were 
negative, suggesting somewhat negative effects of competition on Science 
proficiency when ran on schools across Utah.  The model suggests, ceteris 
paribus, that each additional charter school within 3 miles of a traditional public 
school is associated with a decline in the portion proficient in Science by 1.4%, 
which is less than one quarter of one standard deviation.  The lack of significance 
and consistency in the other measures of competition gives some hesitation in 
looking too deep into these particular results.  Measuring the effect of competition 
on Science proficiency will continue to be more difficult in relation to other 
subjects.  The demographic controls appeared to be consistent with the other 
models, and mostly statistically significant.  The overall R squared measures for 
Science proficiency ranged from 0.43 to 0.54. 
Next, I discuss the model results for average scores, in contrast to the 
portion of enrollment that is proficient in each subject.  First, a note on the 
differences is necessary.  It is intentional that the tables and discussion are 
presented with the proficiency measures first.  This is somewhat due to the fact 
that a portion proficiency measure can arguably give a better understanding of a 
school’s overall academic achievement rather than using an average score.  The 
distinction between the portion of a school’s enrollment that is deemed proficient 
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in a subject and a school’s average score in that subject is small but important.  
An average score, as a mean, may easily be influenced by outliers.  On the other 
hand, a measure of proficiency, I argue, will give a better sense of overall school 
success and school quality.  These distinctions remain important in the education 
literature, and are indeed worth briefly addressing in my research.  Although my 
statewide model results include both measures, I argue that the proficiency 
measure is perhaps more persuasive due to these facts.    
The results using the average scores for each subject are found in Tables 
6.4 through 6.6.  First, it is clear that the average test score estimates are 
consistent with the proficiency estimates for each subject.  This consistency 
across models should provide reliability in their estimates and indeed accuracy in 
all of the results.  A second observation comes in the fact that the coefficient 
estimates for the average test scores remain somewhat smaller in size than what 
would perhaps be expected.  According to these results, it becomes more difficult 
for competitive effects to influence the average score for a traditional public 
school than it is to influence the portion of enrollment that is proficient.  In other 
words, the competitive effects from charter schools appear to have greater 
impact on the portion of students that are proficient than the average test score 
for each school.   
In looking at the statewide model results, we see mixed evidence overall 
of charter competition.  While the strongest results come in gains for Language 
Arts proficiency, there also exist some negative effects for Math proficiency.  
These results are entirely consistent with much of the literature, in that they find 
significant positive gains from competition for some subjects and negative and/or 
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negligible competitive effects for other subjects.  Next, I will look at the results for 





Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah Counties Subset 
 
 More than many other states, Utah’s population is relatively concentrated 
in a single area.  Partly due to the geographic features of the bordering rocky 
mountains, much of Utah’s population is concentrated among three counties 
(Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah), which make up most of the so-called “Wasatch 
Front.”  Not surprisingly, the majority number of schools is also concentrated in 
this area.  In terms of K-6 public schools (as defined by the parameters set forth 
in my dataset) across Utah, we see a majority (58.2%) number of schools among 
those three counties.  In terms of K-6 public school enrollment, 68.4% of students 
are enrolled among those three counties.  Moreover, as of 2010, 74% of K-6 
predefined charter schools operate in one of those three counties.  Having a high 
concentration of schools and student enrollment among one specific area is 
certainly grounds for separate investigations.    
Considering these realities, it is necessary and interesting to run my 
empirical models for separate subgroups.  In this section, I constrain the models 
to Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah counties to explore the possibility for different 
results.  For the sake of brevity, I only present proficiency measures for each of 
the separate subsets.  As we saw in the statewide results, the average score 
estimates were entirely consistent with the proficiency measures.  Moreover, I 
argue that the proficiency measures offer a better representation of student 
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success and school quality.  As a note, I also limit the number of models ran for 
the subsets to 7 rather than 11 in order to reduce redundancy. 
Again, we begin with the model estimates on Language Arts proficiency, 
found in Table 6.7.  Again, we see evidence of positive competitive effects from 
charter competition on the portion of students in traditional public schools that are 
proficient in Language Arts.  Consistent with the prior models, the strongest 
measure of competition appears to be the dichotomous measure indicating when 
at least three charter schools exist within 5 miles of a traditional public school.  
When indicated, this measure suggests a 1.2% increase in Language Arts 
proficiency, ceteris paribus.  Consistent with the statewide models, this estimate 
is approximately three times the size of the average gain seen in Language Arts 
proficiency for the subset over the time period.  The demographic controls all 
have the expected signs, consistent across prior models.  The overall model fit 
seems to be slightly better, given this more homogenous group, and the R 
squared figures range from 0.70 to 0.71. 
With regards to the Math proficiency models for this subset found in Table 
6.8, we also see consistent estimates with the statewide results.  The models 
suggest somewhat negative effects from charter competition on Math proficiency 
for the three selected counties.  The strongest measure of competition remains 
the dichotomous measure indicating when at least three charter schools exist 
within 5 miles of the traditional public school, giving a -1.6% coefficient.  
Consistent with the statewide results, we also notice the positive estimate of the 
nonlinear competitive threshold dichotomous variable, suggesting perhaps 
district-level gains from competition, but individual school-level losses from more 
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direct competition.  The demographic controls are also consistent and R squared 
figures range from 0.52 to 0.58. 
Lastly, we turn to the Science proficiency results for this smaller subset 
found in Table 6.9.  These estimates suggest somewhat negligible effects of 
charter competition on Science proficiency for this smaller subset.  The only 
statistically significant measure is the count of charter schools within 3 miles of 
the traditional public school, which carries a negative estimate of about 1.2%.  
This is smaller than the statewide estimate for the same measure, but important 
nonetheless.  The demographic controls remain entirely consistent and R 
squared figures range from 0.56 to 0.59.   
Seeing consistent results from this particular subset is perhaps not entirely 
interesting, but the exercise is indeed important.  The consistency, in fact, comes 
as no surprise given the high levels of population and school concentration, 
already outlined.  The separate subset for Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah counties 





Salt Lake County Subset 
 
 Lastly, I explore an even smaller subset for the empirical models, namely 
that solely of Salt Lake County.  There are principally two main characteristics 
that motivate this separate analysis for Salt Lake County.  First, as previously 
mentioned, a large concentration of population and students exist in Salt Lake 
County.  Secondly, being a more urban area, it contains a much more diverse 
population, in terms of race, income, age, etc.  Previous studies, such as Ni 
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(2009), have found differences in empirical results for urban and rural areas.  
Moreover, the literature has shown that charter schools tend to attract students in 
large cities and urban areas, often due to lower school quality in those areas.  
For instance, Glomm, et al. (2005) have found that charter schools tend to locate 
in areas where populations are racially and educationally diverse.   All of these 
reasons provide rationale for my fixed-effect models to be run on schools solely 
in Salt Lake County. 
 Rather than go through each subject, I will discuss some of the similarities 
and differences exhibited in Salt Lake County in relation to the other model 
sections.  All of the Salt Lake County results are found in Tables 6.10 to 6.12.  
First, we again see positive competitive effects on Language Arts proficiency in 
Salt Lake County.  These coefficient estimates for the dichotomous variable 
indicating when at least three charter schools exist within 5 miles are almost 
identical to the statewide estimates.  Looking at the continuous count of charter 
schools within 3 miles, however, the Salt Lake County model produces much 
larger results (1.3 compared to 0.8), suggesting greater competitive gains from 
charters nearby for traditional public schools.  With regards to Math proficiency, 
we see mainly negligible and entirely not statistically significant results.  This 
would suggest that any negative effect from charter competition on Math 
proficiency is mostly outside of Salt Lake County.  The same can be repeated for 
Science proficiency, where we see negligible/no effects of competition for Salt 
Lake County.   
 Constraining the models to Salt Lake County has produced somewhat 
interesting results in relation to the overall statewide estimates.  Salt Lake County 
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is indeed diverse in many aspects, and this data suggests that charter 
competition has provided substantial gains in achievement for traditional public 
schools, at least in the subject of Language Arts, and somewhat negligible 
effects on achievement in Math and Science.  This should ultimately provide key 
insights into future education policy.  Specifically, it highlights the need for 
separate and distinct approaches for different counties and geographical areas in 
Utah.   
 
 
Student Self-Selection, Skimming, and Endogeneity 
 
 The potential impacts of student self-selection and charter school location 
endogeneity must be addressed along with my empirical estimates.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there is a potential for endogeneity with respect to 
charter school location.  Since the location of charter schools in Utah is a function 
of local demand for school options, it is likely that charters will locate in areas that 
exhibit low academic quality, high parental dissatisfaction, or both.  Essentially, 
charter school location may indeed be a function, at least partially, of existing 
trends in academic achievement.  This fact opens the opportunity for various 
feedback mechanisms to influence the empirical estimates.  I will first mention 
the statistical avenues that deal with endogeneity and then discuss the potential 
student self-selection impacts for biased estimates. 
 The location of charter schools is not only an issue for state and local 
education policy, but certainly must be addressed in any statistical approaches.  
As outlined in Chapter 5, my estimation is done through a fixed-effect model that 
contains a three-way error component, ߝ௜௧ ൌ 	 ߤ௜ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅	ߠ௜. While ߭௜௧ and ߠ௜ 
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control for any “usual” idiosyncratic error and time error, respectively, it is ߤ௜ that 
is of interest for potential endogeneity.  The error component ߤ௜ accounts for any 
fixed underlying differences in school quality and also accounts for historical 
aspects that influence charter school location.  Moreover, potential endogeneity 
is dealt with further by the fact that the fixed-effect linear regression allows for 
correlation between ߤ௜ and ܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧.  This notion is noted and similar 
methodology used by Booker, et al. (2008), Bifulco and Ladd (2004), Sass 
(2006), and Ni (2009).  Essentially, this particular approach allows the location of 
the charter school to be related to the unobserved differences among traditional 
public schools, which is an important component of the estimation due to the 
previously mentioned reasons that influence charter school location, namely the 
historic trends and achievement. 
 Next, I address the potential issues arising from student self-selection.  As 
often addressed in the school choice literature, student self-selection might be a 
possible explanation driving at least some of the achievement results, at least for 
some districts.  When a charter school opens up in a neighborhood, it may attract 
students who are already performing at a relatively higher level than their cohorts 
who remain in the traditional public schools.  Theoretically, the parents who 
choose to explore educational opportunities for their children are already more 
likely to be heavily involved in their child’s education.  Consequentially, and 
theoretically, the children who enroll in charter schools are, all else equal, likely 
to be inherently different than the children who remain in traditional public 
schools.  Therefore, this specific type of self-selection would cause the empirical 
74 
results to be biased downward (and leave the traditional public schools worse off 
from charter competition) since the students who remain in the traditional public 
schools will perform relatively less than those who move to a charter school.  
(This idea is known as “cream skimming” and is substantially addressed by 
Holmes, et al. (2003) and Hoxby (2003)).  Alternatively, if, after a new charter 
school opens in an area, migrating students to the charter school are relatively 
lower performers, than the opposite would be true.  We would expect the 
traditional public schools to be better off (perform better) after being exposed to 
charter competition.  Since many (but not all) of my results suggest positive 
effects from charter competition, let us examine the possibility that the positive 
estimates are due to student self-selection where the migrating students are 
performing at a lower level.   Although these inquiries remain somewhat outside 
the scope of my research, they are indeed worth addressing, if nothing less, as a 
theoretical explanation to the achievement results.   
 Since all of my data is school-level rather than individual-level, I cannot 
directly compare the achievement levels of migrating students and students who 
remain in the traditional public schools.  With my data, however, I can compare 
the different levels of achievement of traditional public schools compared to 
charter schools in order to see if there are any differences in achievement.  
Looking at Table 6.13, we see some slight differences in achievement levels, 
where charter schools appear to have higher levels of achievement for each 
subject and each measure in all years, except for a few cases.  When restricted 
to Davis, Salt Lake, and Utah counties (Table 6.14), the differences become 
larger.  Finally, when restricted to only Salt Lake county (Table 6.15), the 
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differences in achievement are even more stark.  Given these measures, it is 
apparent that some evidence exists that the students who migrate to charter 
schools are performing at higher levels, or at least are not performing below their 
traditional public school counterparts.  This being based off of school-level data, 
it must be noted that the achievement differences might indeed be a function 
more of teaching at the different schools, rather than the preexisting ability levels 
of the students.  That being said, these descriptive statistics certainly give us 
reason to believe that, if anything, charter schools are attracting higher achieving 
students.  These facts suggest that my empirical estimates, again if anything, 
may be biased downward (since the students remaining in the traditional public 
schools are at least even or lower achievers to begin with).  These facts will 
certainly add persuasiveness to my results, as they now represent a lower-bound 
estimate of the true effects of charter competition.  It is worth noting that this 
same self-selection analysis was done by Holmes, et al. (2003), where they 





 Lastly, I will address some of the limitations to the overall models and 
results.  Perhaps the most important limitation to the empirical results is the use 
of standardized tests.  For my data, I have used the Criterion Referenced Tests 
(CRT) administered to all Utah public schools.  The test parameters and 
standards have remained consistent throughout the time period specified in my 
data.  In spite of the tests’ consistency, their validation as an instrument of 
academic achievement may be limited.  I was unable to obtain any validation 
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tests for the Criterion Referenced Tests used in Utah, and it indeed remains 
unclear whether any sort of validation tests have even been administered to 
these tests.  A validation test on the CRT instrument could involve administering 
the test to a sample cohort and then longitudinally following that cohort and re-
administering the test at a later time to validate consistency and accuracy.  As 
imperfect as the CRT might be, its scores remain the most widely used and 
reported outcomes in Utah.  Similar standardized test instruments are used in the 
overwhelming majority of the existing literature.  A complimentary study on the 
impact of charter competition on a high school level could include different 
measures of academic achievement, namely those of drop-out rates, the portion 
of enrolled students who continue to a higher education institution, or even some 
labor market outcomes.  Further study on high school level institutions would 
prove to be beneficial for education policy. 
 Timing is another limitation worth noting, that will be addressed more 
substantially in Chapter 7.  Although the six year period used in my data is 
statistically sufficient for examining the competitive effects, Utah is still quite early 
in their charter growth phase.  Allowing more years to pass will arguably add 
strength to the empirical estimates.  However, the fact that some significant 





 The statistical estimations have provided some interesting results, some of 
which are expected, and some come as a surprise.  The interpretation of these 
results should clearly be done with some caution.  Viewing these results through 
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a more abstract lens, we see a tale of two effects.  The results suggest that 
competitive effects are being felt on two levels: a district level and an individual 
school level.  While Language Arts achievement is increased from competition on 
both levels, Math achievement only appears to be increased on a district level.  
Science, on the other hand is less clear overall.  These notions are clearly shown 
by the different coefficient estimates for each of the different measures of 
competition.  As noted for Math achievement, the estimates for the district 
measure of competition show positive effects from strong charter competition on 
a district level, but some negative effects from charter competition on an 
individual school level.  The plausible avenues of explanation for these 













































-0.235 -0.023 -0.231 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024* -0.038** -0.021 -0.025* -0.023 -0.023
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
-0.240** -0.246** -0.250** -0.252** -0.255** -0.254** -0.263** -0.242** -0.244** -0.256** -0.244**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
81.1** 81.0** 80.9** 81.0** 81.0** 81.1** 82.8** 81.5** 81.1** 81.1** 81.1**
(1.102) (1.105) (1.112) (1.116) (1.107) (1.103) (1.154) (1.078) (1.092) (1.108) (1.092)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,645 for all regressions.
Group N = 473 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size, not statistically significant, and not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Language Arts
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible
Percent of enrollment 
Hispanic
0.521 0.520 0.515 0.639
Constant
R squared (overall) 0.516 0.517 0.516
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
































-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.022 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
-0.349** -0.348** -0.345** -0.338** -0.330** -0.325** -0.318** -0.355** -0.359** -0.340** -0.348**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.057) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
81.1** 81.1** 81.1** 81.1** 81.1** 81.0** 80.2** 81.4** 81.1** 81.0** 81.0**
(1.411) (1.410) (1.408) (1.402) (1.399) (1.391) (1.550) (1.389) (1.391) (1.394) (1.405)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,645 for all regressions.
Group N = 473 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Math
0.422 0.427 0.401 0.406
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible
0.399 0.389 0.380 0.385 0.527
Percent of enrollment 
Hispanic
Constant
R squared (overall) 0.405 0.404
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
































-0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
-0.330** -0.326** -0.317** -0.319** -0.317** -0.304** -0.240** -0.334** -0.330** -0.328** -0.332**
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079) (0.084) (0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077)
68.4** 68.5** 68.6** 68.5** 68.4** 68.4** 66.3** 68.3** 68.3** 68.3** 68.3**
(1.617) (1.601) (1.589) (1.593) (1.596) (1.587) (2.232) (1.606) (1.598) (1.610) (1.613)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,583 for all regressions.
Group N = 463 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Science
0.4660.447 0.430 0.445 0.450 0.4380.460 0.539 0.466 0.457 0.465
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible




































-0.008** -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.008** -0.013** -0.007* -0.008** -0.008* -0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.063** -0.065** -0.067** -0.069** -0.070** -0.071** -0.067** -0.064** -0.064** -0.070** -0.065**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
167.8** 167.8** 167.8** 167.8** 167.8** 167.8** 168.4** 168.0** 167.8** 167.8** 167.8**
(0.324) (0.323) (0.326) (0.327) (0.324) (0.325) (0.349) (0.318) (0.321) (0.327) (0.321)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,583 for all regressions.
Group N = 463 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Language Arts CRT Average Score
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
0.558
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
0.435
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible
Percent of enrollment 
Hispanic
Constant
R squared (overall) 0.451 0.446 0.440 0.441 0.441
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size, not statistically significant, and not reported.
































-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011** -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.078** -0.078** -0.077** -0.076** -0.073** -0.074** -0.088** -0.080** -0.081** -0.077** -0.078**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
168.8** 168.8** 168.8** 168.8** 168.8** 168.8** 168.8** 169.0** 168.8** 168.8** 168.8**
(0.423) (0.424) (0.424) (0.423) (0.421) (0.419) (0.488) (0.416) (0.414) (0.420) (0.421)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,583 for all regressions.
Group N = 463 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Math CRT Average Score
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Constant
R squared (overall) 0.361 0.367 0.400 0.392 0.368 0.371
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible
Percent of enrollment 
Hispanic
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size, not statistically significant, and not reported.
































-0.008* -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010* -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.059** -0.059** -0.058** -0.060** -0.061** -0.056** -0.056* -0.060** -0.059** -0.061** -0.061**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.061)
163.1** 163.1** 163.1** 163.1** 163.1** 163.1** 163.2** 163.1** 163.1** 163.1** 163.1**
(0.413) (0.407) (0.407) (0.409) (0.408) (0.407) (0.638) (0.406) (0.407) (0.412) (0.410)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 2,583 for all regressions.
Group N = 463 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Science CRT Average Score
Percent of district 
enrollment belonging 
to charters
3 charters within 5 
miles of TPS
4 charters wihtin 5 
miles of TPS
0.403R squared (overall) 0.398 0.390 0.393 0.402
Number of charter 
schools within 1 mile
Number of charter 
schools within 2 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 3 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 4 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 5 
miles
Number of charter 
schools within 10 
miles
Distance to Nearest 
Charter (miles)
Charter enrollment 
exceeds 5% of 
district enrollment
Percent of enrollment 
Free/Reduced Lunch 
eligible
Percent of enrollment 
Hispanic
Constant
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size, not statistically significant, and not reported.



























-0.031** -0.031** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032** -0.033** -0.032**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
-0.292** -0.298** -0.300** -0.284** -0.286** -0.289** -0.300**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
82.6** 82.7** 82.9** 83.8** 83.7** 83.7** 83.1**
(1.397) (1.423) (1.389) (1.392) (1.368) (1.385) (1.364)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 728 for all regressions.
Group N = 126 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Language Arts
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant
Percent of enrollment Hispanic



























-0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.013) (0.0128) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
-0.291** -0.275** -0.262** -0.301** -0.292** -0.295** -0.279**
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067)
81.9** 82.9** 83.0** 80.5** 81.1** 80.5** 81.7**
(1.956) (1.918) (1.940) (1.944) (1.954) (1.967) (1.908)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 728 for all regressions.
Group N = 126 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Math
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant
Percent of enrollment Hispanic



























-0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
-0.244* -0.245* -0.234* -0.249* -0.252* -0.247* -0.246*
(0.102) (0.107) (0.106) (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.107)
67.4** 66.4** 67.0** 66.0** 66.0** 66.6** 66.2**
(2.410) (2.470) (2.481) (2.760) (2.613) (2.733) (2.457)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 727 for all regressions.
Group N = 125 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Science
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant
Percent of enrollment Hispanic




























-0.034** -0.033** -0.036** -0.034** -0.031** -0.038** -0.035**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
-0.313** -0.320** -0.328** -0.310** -0.323** -0.341** -0.331**
(0.069) (0.066) (0.068) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069) (0.070)
79.8** 79.9** 79.8** 81.3** 81.6** 80.2** 80.8**
(2.200) (2.118) (2.113) (2.074) (2.160) (2.071) (2.133)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 728 for all regressions.
Group N = 126 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Language Arts
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
0.709 0.730R squared (overall) 0.710 0.727 0.698 0.725 0.738
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant




























-0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
-0.323** -0.321** -0.317** -0.327** -0.316** -0.315** -0.316**
(0.081) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.086) (0.082)
84.4** 84.6** 84.1** 83.6** 84.8** 84.1** 84.0**
(2.830) (2.807) (2.844) (2.862) (2.953) (2.900) (2.829)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 728 for all regressions.
Group N = 126 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Math
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
R squared (overall) 0.595 0.584 0.593 0.594 0.575
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant





























-0.022 -0.020 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.016 -0.022
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
-0.271* -0.259 -0.262 -0.245 -0.262 -0.229 -0.263
(0.137) (0.139) (0.141) (0.136) (0.141) (0.144) (0.144)
64.9** 63.7** 64.1** 64.8** 64.2** 65.4** 64.2**
(3.933) (3.985) (4.185) (4.308) (4.140) (4.052) (4.076)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 1%.
Total observation N = 727 for all regressions.
Group N = 125 for all regressions.
Year dummies coefficients not reported.
Dependent variable: Percent of enrollment proficient in Science
District Size and Student to Faculty Ratio coefficients are negligible in size and not statistically significant, and not 
reported.
0.649
Number of charter schools within 5 miles
Number of charter schools within 3 miles
Distance to Nearest Charter (miles)
Number of charter schools within 10 miles
Percent of district enrollment belonging to 
charters
Charter enrollment exceeds 5% of district 
enrollment
Percent of enrollment Free/Reduced 
Lunch eligible
3 charters within 5 miles of TPS
Constant
Percent of enrollment Hispanic


















TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter 
2005 166.72 167.40 76.53 78.27 167.38 167.45 74.52 75.92 162.01 161.44 62.10 60.52
2006 167.46 167.89 78.61 80.38 167.30 167.09 76.23 76.69 163.15 162.48 65.72 63.09
2007 166.64 167.92 77.37 81.65 166.26 167.22 73.50 78.09 163.02 162.80 65.56 66.56
2008 166.33 167.47 76.87 80.05 166.58 167.39 74.13 76.23 162.96 162.82 65.67 65.91
2009 166.59 167.89 77.98 81.92 164.87 165.11 71.82 72.17 163.13 163.42 65.70 67.44
2010 166.48 167.98 77.09 81.03 166.00 165.65 73.85 72.70 163.63 164.43 67.88 70.68
All figures reflect only K-6 schools that are "regular" under federal classification
Average Score % Proficient
Language Arts Mathematics Science
Average Score % Proficient Average Score % Proficient
TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter 
2005 166.29 169.54 75.17 84.54 166.90 169.64 73.25 84.17 161.92 162.66 61.80 66.16
2006 166.98 168.94 76.91 84.52 166.79 168.29 74.73 80.75 162.69 163.29 64.19 65.98
2007 166.31 168.30 75.88 82.92 165.76 167.59 71.81 79.24 162.61 162.85 64.01 66.58
2008 166.13 167.60 75.98 81.04 166.30 167.44 72.75 76.64 162.74 162.95 64.52 66.32
2009 166.55 168.10 77.49 82.73 164.81 165.34 71.16 73.31 163.05 163.79 65.25 69.00
2010 166.50 168.36 76.74 82.33 166.05 166.00 73.58 74.02 163.58 164.70 67.46 72.10
All figures reflect only K-6 schools that are "regular" under federal classification
Language Arts Mathematics Science









TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter TPS Charter 
2005 164.56 170.14 69.50 86.59 165.61 170.33 69.27 85.42 160.08 162.78 55.20 68.63
2006 165.50 170.16 71.68 87.96 165.34 169.08 70.13 83.36 160.93 164.32 57.49 72.44
2007 164.88 168.72 70.94 84.72 164.23 167.54 66.77 79.65 160.92 162.98 57.57 66.12
2008 164.67 167.08 70.54 79.90 164.55 166.05 67.33 73.06 160.90 162.78 57.51 65.73
2009 165.17 167.40 72.48 80.98 163.19 163.75 65.47 67.90 161.13 163.25 57.50 66.98
2010 165.24 167.76 72.15 80.35 164.63 164.76 68.87 70.64 161.65 164.15 60.14 69.96
All figures reflect only K-6 schools that are "regular" under federal classification
Average Score % Proficient Average Score % Proficient Average Score % Proficient














 Clearly, charter schools remain a popular option in Utah for parents 
seeking alternatives to traditional public school.  My data has covered the years 
2005 to 2010, since which, many additional charter schools have been opened 
and/or approved.  In nearly all cases, charter school demand exceeds capacity, 
indicating a sustained and increased call for more charter schools.  In light of this 
growth, my research will help address the previously unknown competitive 
effects of charter schools on the achievement of traditional public schools.  
Ultimately, my research can help guide the ongoing policy discussions 
surrounding the growth of charter schools in Utah.  In this last chapter, I 
summarize the empirical findings, compare them with the existing literature, 




Summary of the Findings 
 
The results of my empirical investigation suggest somewhat mixed effects 
from charter school competition on students remaining in traditional public 
schools in Utah.  The strongest evidence of competitive effects is seen in their 
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impact on traditional public school achievement in Language Arts, where we see 
tremendous gains from competition.  On a statewide level, the models suggest a 
1.5% increase in the portion of students who are proficient in Language Arts 
when the traditional public school is faced with charter competition.  This gain is 
indeed substantial, considering that it represents the marginal effect of charter 
competition in the short-run (the competition measurement specific to that year 
only and not lagged).  The impact on Language Arts proficiency is shown to be 
even stronger for schools in Salt Lake County.  The competitive effects on Math 
scores, however, are less clear but mostly negative on an individual school level, 
but mostly positive on a district level.  During the 2005-2010 time period, overall 
Math achievement trends were declining for traditional public schools in Utah.  
According to my empirical models, charter competition had a negative effect on 
Math proficiency statewide, but a nonsignificant effect on schools in Salt Lake 
County.  Considering the overall decline in Math scores during this time, we may 
be observing some differences in demand for charter schools by subject.  
Although my data are constrained only to “regular” K-6 schools, there are charter 
schools that have emerged to provide better and more specialized instruction for 
Math.  These newly-emerged charter schools then, might indeed be locating in 
areas with historically poor achievement in Math.  However, it must be noted that 
schools specializing in a particular academic area mostly exist on a high-school 
level, and would therefore be somewhat outside this particular research.  Further 
investigations into charter school location could prove insightful for these 
particular phenomena. Lastly, charter competition appears to have negligible and 
nonsignificant effects on Science scores statewide, and for schools in Salt Lake 
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County.  Some of the same dynamics affecting Math scores might also be 
present for Science achievement, where it is relatively more difficult to explain 
the variance in achievement levels. 
Finally, another insight from my research surfaces in the context of 
student populations.  While the main objective of my research has been to study 
the marginal effects of increased charter competition, it’s hard not to notice the 
tremendous impact of student demographics on student achievement.  Much of 
the variance in student achievement for all three subjects can be explained by 
the percent of enrollment that is free/reduced lunch eligible, and the percent of 
enrollment that is Hispanic.  While my models primarily treat these demographics 
as control variables, it is important to note their substantial impact on 
achievement.  Moreover, in terms of race, Utah’s minority population of young 
students continues to grow, especially with Hispanic students.  This growth will 
continue to present many challenges and opportunities for the public school 
system to adapt and further the goals of increased student achievement across 
all populations.  Indeed, a worthy objective and outcome of increased charter 
competition may well be represented by tremendous increases in minority and 
poor populations. 
Overall, my results are somewhat consistent with the existing literature.  
My measures of competition are many in number and have been used 
throughout the literature.  My statistical approaches are similar to the many 
pieces in the literature, but most closely follow the framework outlined by Ni 
(2009).  The evidence suggesting positive competitive effects on Language Arts 
achievement is entirely consistent with Hoxby (2003), Holmes, et al. (2003), and 
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Sass (2006), but conflicts with Ni (2009).  These discrepancies will inevitably be 
due, partially, to the different locations used for the various analyses, as different 
states inherently have different education populations and policies.  When 
examining the competitive effects on Math and Science achievement, my results 
are somewhat consistent with Buddin and Zimmer (2005).  Said literature 
examined the effects of increased charter use in California’s education market, 
ultimately finding no impact of increased charter competition.   
One unique finding in my results is worth noting in this section, namely, a 
difference found in one of the many measures of competition.  With regards to 
the Math results (Tables 6.2, 6.5, 6.8, and 6.11) that show some negative effects 
of charter competition, we notice that the measure indicating when charter 
enrollment exceeds 5% of district enrollment carries a positive estimate for all 
subsets.  This occurs even when the other measures of competition show 
negative effects of competition.  This unique aspect may provide evidence 
indicating that increased charter competition may have some negative effects on 
some individual schools facing close competition in proximity, but overall gains 
for the entire districts that face higher general levels of competition, at least for 
Math achievement.  The different levels of public school administration may help 
explain these differences, where perhaps the ability to react to competition for 
some individual school principals is inherently different than that of the higher-
level district administrators.  These results are consistent with Hoxby’s (2003) 
argument for including a nonlinear threshold measure of charter competition.  It 
appears that, for Utah, once charter school competition passes a threshold, gains 
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in Math achievement are seen at the district level, but not necessarily at the 
school level for some select schools.     
Another plausible avenue of explanation for the different competitive 
effects by academic subject may be that some traditional public schools are not 
responding to competition in instructional areas of Math as they are in other 
subject areas.  This disproportionate effect on Language Arts may be due to a 
different degree of difficulty in teaching Math and Science areas in K-6 education, 
or even attracting and retaining qualified teachers for those subjects.  The 
models suggest that, generally, traditional public schools are more able to 
respond and quicker to respond to competitive pressures by raising achievement 
in Language Arts than they are in Math or Science.  It is not difficult to imagine 
that a change in curriculum and instruction in areas of Math and Science might 
involve more time and resources than it would for the area of Language Arts.  
Indeed, the results suggest just that. 
Another key finding that is somewhat outside the main scope of my 
research is the lack of significance found for class size measures.  As a control, I 
have included the student-to-faculty ratio for all my models.  However, in almost 
every model, such measure was not found to be statistically significant.  This 
perhaps comes as a surprise to the assumption and notion that reducing class 
sizes will have a positive impact on student achievement.  It is possible that class 
size reductions will in fact have an impact on many educational outcomes, but 
according to my empirical data, it has no effect on student achievement. 
 Lastly, after exploring the results of my empirical analysis, we see that 
charter competition is indeed having an effect on achievement (both positive and 
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negative), but the magnitude of such effects is somewhat small in most, but not 
all, cases.  Timing of the data might be a plausible reason behind why we are 
seeing this.  As noted, the period of 2005-2010 saw much charter growth for 
Utah, but that specific time frame only allows for a limited number of years for 
observing achievement levels following penetration of charter school competition.  
Certainly, some adjustments in response to competitive pressures can be made 
rather quickly, while others will inevitably carry a longer time frame.  This 
limitation is not a unique one in empirical research, but is worth addressing for 
overall context.  Allowing as few as 5 additional years to pass could prove 
worthwhile to this discussion, as is usually the case with empirical data.  
Nonetheless, these results represent a first step in assessing the various impacts 
of charter school growth in Utah on the students who remain in traditional public 





 The beginning premise of my research has been to empirically examine 
the competitive effects of charter school competition on traditional public school 
achievement.  By focusing on a particular subset of Utah education (K-6 regular 
schools), I have created a homogenous group for statistical estimation.  At the 
same time, however, this process opens up the opportunity for research in other 
related areas. 
 First, further research that examines charter competition on a high-school 
level is certainly warranted.  Many of the charter schools that have emerged in 
Utah over the past decade have been on a high-school level, and many of them 
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specialize in particular subject areas (Math, Science, etc.).  Certainly, their 
impact on traditional public high school achievement would be an interesting 
addition to this research.  Moreover, investigating high-school level institutions 
provides additional measures of achievement.  On a K-6 level, I have used 
standardized test proficiency metrics and scores for outcome measures.  In 
addition to these same test metrics, a high-school level analysis could provide 
additional measures such as drop-out rates, college-going rates, and even some 
labor market outcomes.  These additional measures of achievement would 
perhaps give a more complete view of the impacts of charter school competition, 
while at the same time offering further insight into education markets and 
behavior. 
 Next, increased competition in the education market not only provides 
incentives for student achievement, but also may change the overall labor market 
for teachers.  Given the notion that increased charter competition provides 
pressure to increase school quality to attract and retain students, it’s plausible to 
think that increased competition also provides incentives for schools and districts 
to attract and retain teachers. Although it has remained outside the narrow scope 
of my research, this topic has been discussed by Hoxby (2002), where she found 
evidence suggesting that increased school competition makes schools place 
more value on teachers’ effort and the overall quality of teachers.  Further 
evidence on Utah’s labor market in education would certainly prove beneficial, 
where funding constraints are heavily felt. 
 Lastly, with school-level achievement data, the opportunity may exist to 
apply different weights to charter competition according to the level of existing 
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achievement for each charter school.  By doing so, the price of attending a 
competing charter school can be adjusted for quality.  It would be expected that 
there exist stronger competitive effects from charter schools with high 
achievement levels.   Conversely, charter schools with relatively lower 
achievement levels might not necessarily induce the same competitive 
pressures.  Accepted economic theory would lend related quality-adjusted 
principles in this arena and would prove beneficial to the overall impacts of 





 An attractive characteristic of empirical research is the real possibility of 
the results influencing policy discussions.  This is especially the case in 
education research where policy consequences remain particularly high.  The 
results of my research represent statistical estimates of empirical data that are 
ultimately built on a foundation of economic theory.  I have shown that economic 
theory argues that increased competition in the education market provides 
incentives for traditional public schools to make meaningful changes that will 
raise the academic achievement of their students and ultimately attract and retain 
more students.  The statistical models constructed provide results that are 
mostly, but not entirely, consistent with these economic theories.   
To provide evidence and substance to Utah’s education policies, the 
unique aspects of the state have been addressed in Chapter 3.  Clearly, given 
the increase in charter school demand and popularity, Utah’s population 
continues to seek alternatives and choices within the public school system.   
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Given the slightly different roles that charter and traditional public schools play in 
the state of Utah, it would clearly be desired that this increased competition 
brings about a greater degree of cooperation.  An ongoing issue in Utah happens 
to be the constraints and limits of funding provided to public education, given the 
state’s relatively larger family sizes and rapidly growing population.  These 
constraints often translate into larger class sizes and heavier workloads for 
teachers.  Charter schools have provided a pressure relief valve of sorts for the 
constrained traditional public school system, as they offer to educate children, 
and generally do so at a lower per-pupil cost.   
The empirical results of my research suggest that this increase in charter 
school use also carries external “spill-over” benefits to the students who remain 
in the traditional public schools, although not in all areas.  According to the 
models, the districts that have seen a greater degree of charter competition tend 
to see increases in traditional public school achievement precisely due to the 
increased competition from charter schools, even and especially after controlling 
for demographic and year effects.  For Utah’s education policy, this means that 
greater charter school use can primarily act as a relief valve for many 
constrained schools while simultaneously provide meaningful incentives for 
traditional public schools to increase achievement.  It is the argument of the 
author, therefore, that Utah’s education policy-makers should continue to 
approve charter schools for areas that demand them, as they provide meaningful 
school options for families that cannot afford private schools, while offering 
mostly positive externalities for student achievement.  Borrowing terminology 
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from Hoxby (2003), it is evident that a greater degree of school choice in Utah 
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